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Managerial Litigants? The
Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution
by
SARAH RUDOLPH COLE*

In recent years, both courts and legislatures have expressed a
strong preference for alternative dispute resolution tools as a means
for encouraging settlement and reducing judicial workloads.1 This
preference for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has resulted in
courts adopting mediation and arbitration techniques within the
confines of the traditional litigation process. 2
Court-annexed
arbitration and court-ordered mediation, for instance, are now
common in courts across the country. 3 This widespread use of ADR
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law. My thanks to
Douglas Cole, Nancy Rogers, Wallace Rudolph, Arthur Greenbaum, and Ruth Colker for
their input and to Amy Muth and Emily Haynes for their excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., GABRIEL WILNER, 2 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4.01
(rev. ed. 1998) (explaining that "[t]here is little doubt that the sudden interest shown by
the courts and the legislators in the various forms of alternative dispute resolution, with an
emphasis on arbitration, as a means to relieve the burdens of the judicial system and to
make justice accessible and affordable to a greater number of citizens is due to a large
extent to the current court congestion"); Jona Goldschmidt & Michael Hallett, Balancing
Act: Implementing a Statewide, Court-SponsoredADR Program,80 JUDICATURE 222, 229
(1997) (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court distributes funds to courts statewide to
implement ADR programs to reduce court caseloads); Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh,
Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's PhilosophicalMap?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL. 376, 380 (1997) (stating that Minnesota encourages use of ADR in order to
reduce caseloads); Gary Spencer & Carl Gaines, Heavy Backlog Leads to Forced ADR,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 28, 1998, at A8 (stating that the federal court for the Northern District of
New York requires parties to participate in ADR in order to reduce the backlog of cases
facing the court).
2. See The Director as Futurist: Jack HannaPreviews 'Coming Attractions' in ADR,
ADR REPORT, Feb. 16, 2000, at 4 (discussing the impact of the "huge trend" toward
increasing legalization and institutionalization of mediation).
3. As of 1997, 22 of the 94 federal district courts and 33 states offered court-annexed
arbitration. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGRET SHAW, COURT ADR: ELEMENTS
FOR PROGRAM DESIGN (1992). By 1998, one quarter of federal district courts had created
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techniques is not surprising; studies of mediation and arbitration
continue to demonstrate that these ADR tools provide efficient, low

cost dispute resolution, while at the same time providing a high
degree of party satisfaction. 4

While the increased judicial acceptance of ADR is not surprising,
it does create a fundamental, but as yet largely unrecognized,
problem for courts. ADR is built primarily on a party autonomy
model; party consent is the nearly exclusive guiding principle for
process design. Both arbitration and mediation, for instance, began
as wholly private dispute resolution mechanisms subject to nearly
complete party control.5 In mediation, for example, the parties
control virtually every aspect of the process from the subject matter

6
of the discussion to the drafting of the settlement agreement.

Similarly, in arbitration, the parties control how evidence is
presented, what procedural rules will apply, how the arbitrator will
render his decision and what remedies the arbitrator may award.7 In

either court-annexed or voluntary arbitration programs. Moreover, 51 federal district
courts maintain court-annexed mediation programs. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE,
PRIVATE JUSTICE:

THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4 (2000).

The

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1998), requires every
federal district court to implement a dispute resolution program and authorizes the court
to create mandatory mediation programs.
4. See generally NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION RESEARCH:
A REPORT ON CURRENT RESEARCH FINDINGSIMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS

(Susan Ketlitz ed., 1994)

(time and cost results vary for court mediation programs); Kent Snapp, Five Years of
Random Testing Shows Early ADR Successful, 3 DISP. RESOL. MAO. 16 (1997) (Federal
Judicial Center study of one federal district court finds cases settle earlier with mediation
and attorneys save costs); but see generally JAMES S. KAKALIK, AN EVALUATION OF
MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

Acr (1996) (RAND corporation researchers studying four federal court mediation and

two early neutral evaluation programs find that programs have little effect on costs or time
for parties or the court).
5. SPIDR, one of the largest organized groups of mediators in the United States,
emphasizes the importance of protecting the concept of party autonomy in the mediation
process. See Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Ensuring Competence and
Quality in Dispute Resolution Practice, in REPORT 2 OF THE SPIDR COMMISSION ON
QUALIFICATIONS (1995). According to SPIDR, the values and goals of dispute resolution
include, "increased disputant participation and control of the process and outcome." Id. at
5. A similar attitude pervades arbitration. According to the drafters of the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, arbitration is a consensual process in which party autonomy
receives primary consideration. See Revised Unif. Arbitration Act, Prefatory Note
(Proposed Revisions, Feb. 23, 2000).
6. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982)
(according to Riskin, in mediation the ultimate control remains with the parties).
7. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. UJ. 425,
433-34 (1988); JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., ARBITRATION, at 209-24 (1996) (discussing
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fact, studies suggest that it is the parties' ability to retain control of
these processes that makes them so willing to participate.8
To date, in adopting the traditional ADR tools for their own use,
courts have largely accepted the party autonomy model, willingly
adapting their own processes to meet the articulated needs of the
litigants.9 Indeed, in light of the demonstrated willingness of courts to
shape their procedures based on litigant requests, one could easily
argue that the era of managerial judging10 is over and a new age of
"managerial litigants" has begun. These managerial litigants attempt
to shape the process used to decide their disputes, and expect the
courts to implement any approach upon which the parties have
agreed.
The question of whether, and to what extent, this type of litigant
control over the dispute resolution process in the judicial setting is
appropriate, however, has been largely ignored. Mediation and
arbitration have traditionally been wholly private processes, and thus
it is neither surprising nor particularly troublesome that parties
participating in these processes have substantial autonomy. Courts,
however, are not private institutions. They are public institutions,
parties' ability to craft arbitration procedures to suit their needs).
8. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 29 (1988) (disputants view dispute resolution processes as fairer
when process control is vested in those affected by the decision).
9. In several instances, courts have sanctioned party requests despite a lack of
authorization from a federal or state statute. For example, courts have upheld the
authority of arbitrators to decide cases or issues without an evidentiary hearing when
asked to do so by the parties. See Revised Unif. Arbitration Act § 15(b) (Proposed
Revisions, Feb. 23, 2000). Many courts have granted party requests for judicial review of
arbitral awards on grounds beyond those articulated in the Federal Arbitration Act. See
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997); Syncor Int'l Corp.
v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997)
(per curiam) (parties agreed that arbitration decision would be reviewed for "errors of
law"); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995);
New England Util. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53,57 (D. Mass. 1998) (parties agreed
to judicial review of arbitral award for errors of law); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New
York City Transit Auth., 14 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1994) (parties agree to judicial review of
arbitral award under "arbitrary and capricious" standard); South Wash. Assocs. v.
Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (parties agree to same standard of review as
is used to review findings of fact and conclusions of law by a Colorado District Court). In
the mediation context, magistrates and judges are frequently asked to act as mediators in
cases over which they are scheduled to preside. See, e.g., Hameli v. Nazario, 930 F. Supp.
171, 182 (D. Del. 1996) (stating it may be appropriate for magistrates to act as mediators);
but see Evans v. State, 603 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
10. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (describing
managerial judging as the increased willingness of judges to manage cases through devices
such as pre-trial settlement conferences).
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funded by public resources, designed to serve a public function."
While this public function often includes adjudication of public rights
between private litigants, the court nevertheless maintains its identity
as a public institution even when acting in this capacity.12 The court's
power derives not from contract but from statute. 13 Those same
statutes, however, constrain the court both with respect to the cases it
may hear,14 and with respect to the dispute resolution procedures it
may employ. 15 The outcomes of judicial proceedings, i.e., opinions,
are similarly public in nature. While a court's opinion certainly
impacts the litigants before it, the opinion also becomes a component
of the public good known as precedent, and benefits society as a
whole by increasing the predictability of legal rules, thereby allowing
16
for more efficient private ordering.
It is the tension between the court's nature as a public institution,
and its interest in speedy resolution of particular disputes between
private litigants that appear before it, which lies at the heart of the
debate over the appropriate treatment of managerial litigants'
requests for non-traditional judicial involvement in disputes. As
governmental institutions imbued with substantial power, courts must
act in a manner consistent with their institutional duties and
obligations. Courts and commentators have referred to this need to
remain faithful to institutional underpinnings as "institutional
integrity."'17 In other words, judges must act judicially; they must
comport themselves in a manner consistent with traditional
11. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,1085 (1984).
12. See id. ("[The court's job] is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor
simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in
authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes.").
13. See iL
14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1343, 1345 (1999) (describing the extent of federal
district courts' limited jurisdiction). See also King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 967 (6th Cir.
1985) (involving scope of judicial immunity and stating that "federal courts indisputably
are courts of limited jurisdiction"); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39 F. Supp. 2d 479, 489 (D.N.J.
1999) (same); Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.
1970) (stating that federal courts have limited jurisdiction so litigants must properly plead
diversity of citizenship).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that there shall only be one form of action); FED. R.
CIV. P. 16 (outlining the court's duties regarding pretrial settlement efforts).
16. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)
(judgments should not be vacated simply because the settlement agreement provides for
it-precedent has a public value); In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d
1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1998) (precedent has a social value).
17. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 1989);
Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 507 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Grynberg Prod.
Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C. 867 F. Supp. 1278, 1286 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
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understandings of social behavior. Moreover, courts must protect
themselves from abuses of the judicial process that might make them
18
appear to be unprincipled decision-makers.
Managerial litigants' requests for non-traditional judicial
intervention present the possibility of significant threats to the courts'
institutional integrity. Imagine, for instance, that the parties have
agreed that a court will have the power to review an arbitral award,
but that the review must be accomplished by flipping a coin, or by
casting lots. While the parties could certainly agree to resolve their
disputes privately by such means, co-opting a judge to employ such
procedures presents implications for the courts' institutional integrity.
While managerial litigants have yet to propose procedures this
extreme, they have undeniably started down this path. Already
parties have jointly requested courts to perform review of arbitral
awards on bases not specified in the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),19 they have asked judges to act as mediators,20 and they have
proposed that in assessing arbitral awards the courts decide contested
evidentiary matters without evidentiary hearings.21
In light of such examples, the appropriate treatment of
managerial litigants' requests is no longer merely an academic
question. Courts need a reliable and consistent framework for
evaluating the various requests and determining which they will
adopt, and which they must deny. In constructing such a framework,
it is instructive to note that while in the context of arbitration and
mediation the courts have been remarkably open to litigants'
requests, the same has not been as true elsewhere. Take, for

18. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 651; Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 507; Grynberg,867 F. Supp. at
1286.
19. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997);
Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995); Syncor
Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug.
11, 1997) (per curiam) (parties agreed that arbitration decision would be reviewed for
"errors of law"); New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D. Mass.
1998) (parties agreed to judicial review of arbitral award for errors of law); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 14 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1994) (parties agree
to judicial review of arbitral award under "arbitrary and capricious" standard); South
Wash. Assocs. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (parties agree to same
standard of review as is used to review findings of fact and conclusions of law by a
Colorado District Court).
20. See, e.g., Hameli v. Nazario, 930 F. Supp. 171,182 (D. Del. 1996).
21. See Arbitration between InterCarbon Bermuda, Ltd. and Caltex Trading and
Transp. Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer &
Susman, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (1995); Stifler v. Weiner, 488 A.2d 192 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985); Pegasus Constr. Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 929 P.2d 1200 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
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example, the judicial response to requests for vacatur. In the typical
case, parties file a joint motion requesting that a court vacate a lower
court judgment as a condition precedent to settlement of the parties'
dispute.22 Despite agreement among the parties, courts faced with
these requests did not merely rubber-stamp them. Rather, they first
considered whether courts have the statutory authority to effect the
vacatur. Finding such authority in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b),23 courts next balanced the parties' interest in settling their
dispute against the impact granting the request would have on the
court's institutional integrity. 24 In particular, courts focused on the
concern that if society believes that parties may use court decisions as
bargaining chips in an effort to obtain a particular result, society may
lose respect both for the decisions courts make and the courts
themselves. 25 The courts also recognized that this concern may be
heightened where, as in the context of a request for vacatur, the
litigants are asking courts to destroy a public good-precedent-in
order to satisfy purely private needs. Finding that the two interests
could not be reconciled, courts ultimately concluded that requests for
26
vacatur are impermissible.
Courts considered similar issues when confronted with party
requests for summary jury trials. Summary jury trials are designed to
provide parties a realistic assessment of their likely success at trial in
order to encourage parties to settle before trial. Yet summary jury
trials are closely connected to the judicial system. The summary jury
trial is conducted by a state or federal judge with a jury drawn from
the existing jury pool.27 In this sense, summary jury trial is an
expansion of the use of the jury. As Richard Posner noted in his
article on summary jury trials, "[j]ury service is ... a form of

22. See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Memorial
Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1988); Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester's
Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides the federal courts with explicit authority to modify
prior judgments. See also, Nestle Co., 756 F.2d at 282; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S.
601, 614-15 (1949).
24. See, e.g., Yanakas, 11 F.3d at 384; National Union, 891 F.2d at 762; Nestle Co., 756
F.2d at 283.
25. See, e.g., In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, 862 F.2d at 1302; In re United
States, 927 F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936
F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).
26. See, e.g., Yanakas, 11 F.3d at 385; U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership, 513 U.S. 18,23-24 (1994); Nestle Co., 756 F.2d at 284.
27. See In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1993).
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conscription; and conscription is not popular in this country." 2 That
jury service is analogous to involuntary servitude prompted courts to
exercise caution in empaneling jurors for purposes other than those
for which they were originally intended. In other words, before
allowing the parties to utilize the summary jury trial process, courts
first considered whether they had the authority to use the granted
power to grant the parties' request. 29 Second, the court considered
whether the use of the power undermined the institutional integrity of
the courts.30 An examination of the summary jury trial suggests that
both the question of whether authority exists to conduct the trial and
whether to empanel jurors for non-traditional purposes are grave
concerns courts feel obligated to address.
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the fact that the courts were
facing similar issues in both types of cases-how to treat a request for
non-traditional judicial involvement-and despite the fact that the
courts adopted largely indistinguishable methods for addressing these
issues, courts have failed to recognize those similarities or expand
31
upon them to create a uniform judicial treatment of such requests.
In this article, I propose such a uniform treatment. I suggest a twoprong test for courts faced with requests for non-traditional judicial
involvement. First, the court must consider whether Congress
granted it the authority to approve the parties' requests. In other
words, would approval of the parties' request be consistent with the
court's statutory and constitutional mandates? Second, the court
must evaluate whether approval of the parties' request will
impermissibly undermine the institutional integrity of the court.

28. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
DisputeResolution: Some CautionaryObservations,53 U. Cmu. L. RaV. 366,386 (1986).

29. See, e.g., Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990); In
re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157.

30. See Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 508 n.4.
31. Interestingly, at least one judge, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit,
has recognized a connection among some of these devices, analogizing the process for
court review of a request for vacatur to the process a court uses to approve a consent
decree. See In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300-01 (7th Cir.
1988) ("Just as it is inappropriate to approve a consent decree with calls for a profligate
commitment of the court's resources, so it may be inappropriate to approve a settlement
that squanders judicial time that has already been invested."). Professor Judith Resnik
has also noted similarities between consent decrees and requests for vacatur. See Judith
Resnik, Whose Judgment? VacatingJudgments, Preferencesfor Settlement, and the Role of
Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1513 (1994).

Professor Resnik suggests that consent decree requests are similar to vacatur requests
because both occur at the prompting of the parties and are ambiguous in their effects. See
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Application of the second prong of the test may require examination
of several factors including impact on third parties, demand on public
time or resources, and effect on the court's institutional stature. Of
course, the second prong will rarely yield a positive result. It will,
however, force the court to consider, and balance, the competing
interests present in every request for a non-traditional exercise of
judicial power.
This proposed inquiry has much to recommend it, both on
positive and normative grounds. From a positive standpoint, the test
describes what courts are already doing when confronted by novel
party requests both within and outside the ADR context. Thus, the
proposed test both reconciles decisions from separate areas of the
law, and also proposes a framework that courts have proven able to
implement. The proposed test is defensible on normative grounds as
well. A court, as a creature of statute, must look first to a statute to
find a source for the power it wishes to exercise. The test, designed to
ensure that courts act within their power by identifying a statute that
justifies their action, satisfies this concern. The second part of the
test, which forces the court to consider whether granting the parties'
request undermines the court's stature as a public institution, satisfies
a second normative concern, that courts exercising authority ensure
the integrity of the court as an institution.
Part I of the Article lays the groundwork for the proposed test,
reviewing the methods courts have adopted to evaluate parties'
agreements to expand judicial obligations in other areas-specifically,
summary jury trials, consent decrees, requests for vacatur, and
parties' consent for a Federal Magistrate to act as an arbitrator. The
examination of how courts treat parties' choices that, among other
things, implicate the court's institutional stature, illuminates both the
question of whether parties' choices in arbitration and mediation
should be enforced and whether parties' requests for non-traditional
exercises of judicial power should ever be granted. Part II of the
Article proposes a method for evaluating party requests for nontraditional exercises of judicial power drawn from the courts'
jurisprudence in other areas of the law. Part III examines arbitration,
primarily because at the present time managerial litigants are focusing
their efforts to gain control over the court system in that area. Part
III first explains how judicial review became part of the arbitral
process, and then discusses the varying approaches courts have taken
to the question of whether parties to an arbitration agreement may
contract for greater review of arbitral awards than the FAA provides.
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Finally, Part IV of the Article will apply the proposed test to parties'
requests for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards and
demonstrate that the current jurisprudence in that area, which places
no limitations on parties' ability to control the arbitral process, is
flawed.
I. Federal Court Treatment of Non-Traditional Requests for
Judicial Power
Managerial litigants have attempted to obtain non-traditional
exercises of judicial power in at least four distinct but related ways:
requests for issuance of consent decrees, for conducting summary jury
trial, for vacatur of a lower court judgment following settlement on
appeal, and for a magistrate to act as an arbitrator. Despite the
similarities among these requests, courts have made little effort to
synthesize the case law in order to develop a unified approach to
party requests. Moreover, courts have failed to acknowledge that the
analyses courts currently use to evaluate whether they should grant
party requests are remarkably similar. An examination of the judicial
approaches to each type of party request will demonstrate that courts
identify two main issues when evaluating party requests. First, the
court considers whether a statute or rule permits the nontraditional
use. Second, courts balance a number of factors in deciding whether
to grant the request. Among other factors, courts focus on whether
enforcement of the parties' agreement will result in unprincipled
decision-making, as by misallocating judicial resources or
undermining institutional integrity. 32
A. Consent Decrees
An analysis of judicial treatment of consent decrees provides a
useful analogy that will assist courts in determining whether to grant
parties' requests for non-traditional exercises of judicial power. A
consent decree is a settlement agreement, typically containing
injunctive relief, which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.33
32. See infra discussion of judicial treatment of summary jury trial requests, requests
for entry of a consent decree and requests for vacatur.
33. See Thomas M. Mengler, ConsentDecree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning,29

B.C. L. REV. 291, 292 (1988); Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government
by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the

Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 207 (1987). If parties are not interested in
obtaining injunctive relief, they may nevertheless file their settlement with the court. At
the parties' request, the court may agree to retain jurisdiction over the case to ensure that
the damages are paid. The court's discretion to reject the parties' settlement, known as a
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As such it has a "dual character": it is both a contract and judgment.3 4
A consent decree is like a contract because it reflects the agreement
of the parties.3 5 Yet, a consent decree is not merely a contract
because it is an exercise of federal power, enforceable via a contempt
order.3 6 In that respect, it is more like a judgment. The treatment of
consent decrees as a hybrid of contract and judgment has created
controversy over whether courts have authority to enter consent
decrees and, if so, what role courts should play in their enforcement. 37
Consent decrees, at the outset, were creatures of the courts

rather than Congress. Courts began enforcing consent decrees long
before Congress passed legislation authorizing their issuance. 38
Acknowledging the usefulness of consent decrees in facilitating

settlements of complicated cases, Congress has since explicitly
authorized the use of consent decrees in the antitrust context. 39 Even

where Congressional authorization does not exist, however, courts
continue to implement consent decrees.40
In cases where Congress has not explicitly authorized the
issuance of consent decrees, the parties' agreement is the primary
source of the obligations in the decree. 41 Yet the Supreme Court is

quite clear that parties cannot, by giving each other consideration,
purchase an injunction from a court. 42 Instead, a court may only
enforce the parties' agreement if it is within "the general scope of the
consent judgment, is quite limited. See id.at 292 n.1.
34. Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986).
The dominant modem view is that a consent decree has characteristics both of contract
and judgment. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87
MICH. L. REv.321, 324 (1988); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Attorney General'sPolicy on
Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 101 (1987)
(explaining that a consent decree is both a contract and a judgment). Nevertheless, some
courts and commentators view the consent decree primarily as a contract, while others
view it primarily as a judgment. See Kramer, supra,at 324.
35. See Rabkin & Devins, supranote 33, at 207.
36. See id.
37. See generally, Symposium, Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal
Dilemmas, 1987 U. CHI.LEGAL F. 1-155.
38. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); United States v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223,243 (1975).
39. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982).
40. For example, in the civil rights area, the Supreme Court has approved the use of
consent decrees in Title VII cases because they are consistent with the statute's preference
for "voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims." Maimon Schwarzschild,
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairnessof Negotiated
InstitutionalReform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 904 (1984).
41. See Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332,338 (7th Cir. 1987).
42. See System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,651 (1961).
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case made by the pleadings and ... furthers the objectives of the law

upon which the complaint was based. 43 These limitations make sense
because "the special force of a consent decree derives precisely from
the court's involvement." 44 Thus, parties cannot accomplish by
indirection, through their settlement agreement, what they could not

have accomplished directly.45
Finding the authority to enter a consent decree is not the federal
court's only objective when reviewing a consent decree. Assuming

that a court has the authority to enter a consent decree, the judge
then determines whether the court should enter the decree. Unlike a

case where parties privately agree to settle their dispute and ask the
court only to dismiss the ongoing litigation, when parties ask the court
to approve a consent decree, the court is certifying its willingness to
continue involvement in the parties' settlement process and to
exercise its judicial power. This continuing involvement and exercise
of power "put[s] on the line [the court's integrity]." 46 As a result,
although courts are receptive to requests for the entry of a consent
decree, the parties' ability to obtain entry of a consent decree is not
without limits. 47 To alleviate this concern, before the court will

approve the entry of a consent decree, it will typically hold a fairness
hearing. During that hearing, the court will focus on whether the

decree resolves the litigation at issue, is consistent with the laws and
the Constitution, does not have a significant impact on the rights of
third parties, and is an appropriate utilization of judicial resources.48

43. Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986).
The approach outlined in the City of Cleveland case was a departure from earlier Supreme
Court jurisprudence in which the Court had held that the court's authority to enter a
consent decree was limited to those remedies which it could have ordered had it made a
decision on the merits. See Wright, 364 U.S. at 651.
44. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. at 525.
45. See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 33, at 209 ("What parties cannot agree to in
ordinary contracts, they cannot make binding through consent decrees.").
46. Mengler, supra note 33, at 320.
47. See Schwarzschild, supra note 40, at 887.
48. See Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987);
Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 695-97 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Alliance
to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439-42 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Courts also
consider whether interests of members of the public whose interests may not be
represented by the litigants in front of them have been served. See Kasper, 814 F.2d at
338. Some commentators suggest that the fairness hearing is little more than a rubberstamp of the parties' agreement. See Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Cm.
LEGAL F. 43, 47 (explaining that consent decrees are often signed by the judge at the same
time the complaint is filed).
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The consent decree model identifies one method for balancing
litigant interests in imposing on judicial resources for private purposes
while still ensuring protection of the public role of the court. Courts
evaluating consent decrees first identify a statute or rule that permits
the court to approve the party's request. In the consent decree
context, the court's authority to enter a consent decree frequently
emanates from the very statute upon which the complaint is based. 49
The model further suggests that an evaluation of a non-traditional use
of judicial power requires consideration of institutional integrity
concerns. That is, before a court enters a consent decree, it must be
convinced that issuance would not result in a "profligate commitment
of the court's resources," 50 nor be inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws nor have an adverse effect on third parties. 51 This latter
inquiry, although not explicitly identified as an integrity review,
serves that purpose.
Yet consent decrees are not the only judicial practices that shed
light on the question of whether to enforce parties' agreements
requesting non-traditional judicial action. Another judicially created
device, the summary jury trial, suggests even greater limitations on
the parties' ability to demand judicial action, at least where Congress
has not authorized the courts to engage in such action.
B. Swnmary Jury Trial

The summary jury trial, created by Judge Thomas Lambros, a
federal district court judge in Ohio, is intended to foster settlement
52
between parties through a process that utilizes judicial resources.
The theory underlying the summary jury trial is that parties, following
pre-trial discovery and conference, will be more inclined to settle
their dispute if they receive a jury evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of their claims and defenses. At least one commentator
has suggested that the summary jury trial is the best alternative
53
mechanism for predicting the outcome of an actual trial.
49. See, e.g., Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) (holding that consent decree must come within general scope of case made by
pleadings, and must further the objectives of law upon which complaint was based).
50. In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299,1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
51. See id.
52. See Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New
AdversarialModel for a New Era, 50 U. PITT.L. REV. 789,798 (1989).
53. See William D. Underwood, Divergence in the Age of Cost and Delay Reduction:
The Texas Experience with FederalCivil Justice Reform, 25 TEX. TECH. L. Rnv. 261, 313
(1994).
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The summary jury trial allows the parties to try an abbreviated
version of their case to an advisory jury. The jury is selected from the
traditional jury pool.54 Voir dire is conducted, as it would be in a
regular trial, with both sides able to make limited for cause and
peremptory challenges. Following jury selection, each attorney
makes a formal presentation to the jury. This presentation includes
an opening and closing statement and summaries of witness
testimony. 55 Once the presentations are completed, the jury
deliberates and renders a verdict. Following the issuance of the
verdict, the parties are permitted to ask questions of the jurors. At
that point, the parties attempt to settle the case based on the new
information the jury provided.
At the outset, the vast majority of cases concerning summary jury
trials involved challenges to the court's authority to mandate
participation in a summary jury trial. 56 While only a few courts and
commentators have addressed the propriety of a court approving
litigants' joint requests for a summary jury trial, those that have
criticize the summary jury trial primarily on the ground that courts do
not have the authority to conduct a summary jury trial.57 A secondary
basis for criticism is that even if the summary jury trial process is
authorized, it unjustifiably burdens the federal court system because
58
it tends to undermine the court's institutional integrity.
For example, in Hume v. M & C Management, the court
explicitly held that because there is not legislative authority for
utilizing persons as summary jurors, a summary jury trial cannot be
conducted in a federal court.59 In reaching that conclusion, the court
54. See In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154,156 (6th Cir. 1993).
55. See id
56. See id; Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); McKay
v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Strandell v. Jackson County, 838
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
57. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding
that court has no authority to use persons as summary jurors); Posner, supra note 28, at
386; Underwood, supra note 53, at 313; Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the
Work of the Devil? A CurrentAssessment of Summary Jury Trials,69 OR. L. REv. 87,115
(1990).
58. See Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 507; Posner, supra note 28, at 372; Underwood, supra
note 53, at 313; Wiegand, supra note 57.
59. See Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 507. While Hume was never overruled, following a
decision in United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1990), in which the court
held that jurors summoned for a criminal trial had to be discharged from service due to
undue influence from having been exposed to the summary jury trial process, Judge
Lambros issued a general order relating to juror utilization that expressly authorized use
of jurors in a summary jury trial proceeding. See id
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rejected Judge Lambros' theory that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
39(c), authorizing the use of advisory juries, supported the
empaneling of summary jurors. According to the Hume court, a
summary jury is not an advisory jury because it does not advise the
judge how to decide the case.60 The court also rejected the theory
that the Jury Selection and Service Act of 196861 supported the
creation of a summary jury, reasoning that the Act only permits the
empaneling of petit and grand juries.62 Moreover, it found no
authority in the Act for extending the jury obligation so as to require
citizens to serve as summary jurors. 63 In addition, the court
emphasized that the summary jury trial process might serve to
undermine the court's institutional integrity. According to the court,
the use of jurors in the summary jury trial "could compromise the
integrity of the jury system." 64 Judge Posner echoed that sentiment in
his article on summary jury trials, stating that "[i]f word got around
that some jurors are being fooled into thinking they are deciding cases
when they are not, it could undermine the jury system." 65 Finally, the
Hume court emphasized that the overall efficiency of the summary
jury trial has not been established. Thus, utilization of scarce
resources to conduct summary jury trials, absent evidence of the
summary jury trial's efficiency, may not be appropriate.
The few courts examining litigant requests for summary jury
trials have not addressed whether the court's inherent power includes
the ability to conduct a summary jury trial. Yet an analysis of the
scope of courts' inherent power has been conducted both in cases
considering whether courts may mandate participation in summary
jury trial and in other cases involving judicial efforts to facilitate
settlement. Because a court might cite its inherent powers as
justification for granting litigants' request for a summary jury trial, a
discussion of the judicial treatment of this issue is relevant.
Only one court has relied on the theory of inherent powers to
justify mandatory participation in summary jury trials.66 In McKay v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., the court simply stated that, "mandatory summary
jury trials would seem to be within the inherent power of the court."67
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

129 F.R.D. at 509 n.5.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
See Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 509.
See id.
Id. at 508 n.4.
Posner, supra note 28, at 386.
See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43,48 (E.D. Ky,1988).
Id. at 48.

August 2000]

MANAGERIAL LITIGANTS?

1213

In support of this statement, the McKay court cited only one case,
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co.68 Yet Eash stands only for the
proposition that a court may, using its inherent powers, impose jury
costs on parties and attorneys making belated settlements. 69 That
courts have imposed jury costs on parties who do not settle quickly
hardly supports the proposition that the court's inherent powers
include the ability to order a procedure as expensive and complex as a
summary jury trial. In the absence of additional reasoning, it is
difficult to give much weight to the court's contention that inherent
powers include the power to conduct a summary jury trial.
Moreover, other courts have provided considerably more
analysis in reaching the conclusion that inherent authority does not
justify mandating participation in a summary jury trial. The Sixth
Circuit, in In re NLO, held both that rule 16 did not authorize
mandatory party participation in a summary jury trial process and
that the court had no "inherent powers" to authorize such
participation. 70 According to the Sixth Circuit, the inherent powers of
the court to facilitate settlement should be narrowly construed for
fear that to do otherwise would encourage the kind of "judicial highhandedness" that could result in corruption. 71
Other courts addressing the question agree that while they have
the inherent power to manage their own docket, that power should be
narrowly construed. Because "[i]nherent power is simply 'another
name for the power of courts to make common law when statutes and
rules do not address a particular area,"' it is inappropriate to use the
notion of "inherent power" as a license for federal courts to do
whatever they wish in order to facilitate settlement of a dispute.7 2 In
other words, to the extent that a court has inherent power, it must be
exercised in a manner consistent with the limitations of the law it is
charged with enforcing. 73 Thus, exercises of inherent power tend to
68. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).

69. Id. at 568.
70. 5 F.3d 154,157-58 (6th Cir. 1993).

71. Id. at 158 (citing Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657
(7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting)). While the Sixth Circuit's position on Rule 16
changed following the 1993 amendments, the NLO court's holding that "[r]eliance on the
pure inherent authority of the court [to justify mandatory summary jury trials] is...
misplaced" is still binding precedent. See State of Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 164
F.R.D. 469,470 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
72. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion J., dissenting) (citing Soo Line R.R. Co. v.
Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 546,551 (7th Cir. 1988)).
73. See Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) (discussing the Court's "supervisory
power" which is the label given "inherent power" in the criminal context).
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be quite circumscribed and focus primarily on attempts to punish
abuses of the judicial process. 74
Analysis of judicial treatment of summary jury trials suggests
that, in the absence of congressional authorization, even voluntary
agreements requesting court action may be invalid and unlawful. This
analysis also demonstrates that, in the absence of legislative
authorization, neither the court's inherent power nor its power to
facilitate settlement is sufficiently broad to authorize it to engage in a
process simply because it results in a perceived increase in efficiency,
particularly when the exercise of such power would be inconsistent
with the limitations placed on the exercise of the court's power by
existing rules and statutes. Finally, an analysis of the judicial
treatment of summary jury trials suggests that even when a new
process might improve the court's overall efficiency, courts should be
hesitant to implement a process that imposes heavy burdens on the
courts, and, at the same time, may tend to undermine the integrity of
the judicial process. 75
C. Requests for Vacatur

Until the Supreme Court rejected the practice in 1994,76 parties
often agreed to settle their disputes on the condition that the
appellate court vacate the lower court judgment. 7 7 Traditionally,
courts justified their decision to vacate a prior judgment on the basis
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 78 Yet rule 60(b) contains
no explicit language authorizing courts to honor parties' requests for
74. Heileman, 871 F.3d at 651 n.4 (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain
R.R., 854 F.2d 916, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
75. See Hume v. M &C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 508 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1990). Of
course, the imposition on the court's resources as well as on the interests of third parties is
much more significant in a summary jury trial than it would be in the arbitration setting.
While this argues for more permissive treatment of parties' requests to expand judicial
review of arbitral awards, there is little question that such requests impose some burden
on the federal court system. Moreover, as with the summary jury trial, the courts' inherent
power is not sufficiently broad to include the ability to review arbitral awards on any basis
the parties select.
76. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25-26
(1994).
77. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1970); National
Union Fire Ins. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Memorial Hosp.
of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299,1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
78. Rule 60(b) states, in pertinent part, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (6) any.., reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1449 (D.
Conn. 1984).
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vacatur. Nevertheless, courts were quite willing to read rule 60(b) as
conferring broad discretion on courts to grant vacatur requests when
79
made.
In deciding whether to honor the parties' request to vacate the
underlying decision, courts confronted the tension between their
strong interest in facilitating settlement and the concern that routine
vacation of judgments would undermine the court's integrity. Judicial
integrity might be jeopardized if requests to vacate were granted,
because the court's decisions are public acts, entered by public
officials. As such, they have an independent value both as precedent
for the parties to the lawsuit as well as to third parties. 80 More
importantly, as public acts, they were created at a cost to the public
and other litigants. Since they do not belong to the parties alone, they
should not necessarily be used as "bargaining chips" in the settlement
process. 81 While some courts granted the requests to vacate on the
ground that the underlying decision and its fate belongs to the
parties, 82 other courts refused such requests, at least in the absence of
an opportunity to evaluate independently the wisdom of the decision
to vacate. 83 Only through an independent evaluation, the theory
goes, could a court properly consider whether the decision ought to
stand, even if that meant the parties could not reach settlement of
their underlying dispute.84 According to Judge Easterbrook, "[w]hen
the parties' bargain calls for judicial action, however, the benefits of
the settlement to the parties are not the only desiderata." 85
Analogizing to consent decrees, Judge Easterbrook concluded that
judges should not automatically approve requests for vacatur; rather,
they should "ensure that the agreement is an appropriate
'86
commitment of judicial time and complies with legal norms.
79. See id. at 1449-50; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949). A
decision to grant a vacatur request is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Nestle Co., 756 F.2d at 282.
80. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U.S. at 24 (holding that judicial precedents
are "not merely the property of private litigants" and have value to the legal community).
81. See In re MemorialHosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
82. See In re Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (holding that vacatur should be granted in all cases that are settled); Nestle Co.,
756 F.2d at 284 (holding that litigants' interest in settlement outweighs the nonmutual
preclusion interests of third parties).
83. See In re MemorialHosp., 862 F.2d at 1300-01.
84. See id.

85. Id.
86. Id. Judge Easterbrook continued, "D]ust as it is inappropriate to approve a
consent decree that calls for a profligate commitment of the court's resources, so it may be
inappropriate to approve a settlement that squanders judicial time that has already been
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The Supreme Court has since agreed, holding that the value of
precedent, judicial integrity, and the importance of discouraging
collateral attacks on judgments were all legitimate bases upon which a
court could refuse to vacate a judgment at the parties' request.87 The
Bonner Mall case is somewhat different than the traditional request
for vacatur case in that it involved a request to vacate a court of
appeals decision rather than a decision of the district court and
because only one party requested the vacatur. 88 Nevertheless, the
Court's belief that the value of the judicial process and the
importance of the role of precedent outweighed the party's interest in
settlement would seem equally applicable in cases where both parties
made the request and the decision to be vacated had been made by a
federal district court rather than an appellate one. Thus, it would
seem unlikely that future courts would honor a request for vacatur.
Applying the request for vacatur analysis to other cases involving
requests for non-traditional judical action suggests that congressional
authorization for the action is necessary before a court may entertain
a request.89 Once authorization is established, an independent
judicial evaluation of the request may need to be conducted. During
this evaluation, the court would consider the extent to which the
parties' request undermines the institutional integrity of the courts by
imposing costs on third parties or the court or by devaluing
precedent. Yet the vacatur analogy is imperfect. Many of the factors
influencing the decision to conduct an independent judicial evaluation
of a vacatur request, risk of creating an incentive to attack judgments
collaterally and risk of devaluing precedent, do not seem to apply in
other contexts. 90
Thus, a conclusion that an independent judicial evaluation should
always occur before litigants' requests are granted would seem
inappropriate. Perhaps the element that unifies the vacatur requests
and the other kinds of requests is that all raise a concern about the
invested." Id. at 1301.
87. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
88. In dicta, the Court suggested that its reasoning should apply equally to cases where
both parties seek vacatur because the parties' shared interest does not undermine
appellant's voluntary abandonment of his appeal. The Court also observed that its
reasoning should apply to requests for vacatur made at the court of appeals level. Id.
89. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445,1449 (D. Conn. 1984).
90. Of course, in the vacatur context, the factors the court evaluated weighed so
heavily against granting the parties' request that the Court ultimately concluded that a
blanket prohibition against granting vacatur requests was appropriate. Nevertheless, the
concept of an independent judicial evaluation may make sense as applied in other contexts
as a means for balancing the factors for and against granting a particular request.
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importance of maintaining the institutional integrity of the courts.
Viewed at that level of generality, then, the conclusion that requests
that impair or undermine the institutional integrity of the courts
should be rejected seems apt.
D. The Federal Magistrates Act

Unlike the consent decree, summary jury trial, and request for
vacatur, the process for pursuing a case through a magistrate rather
than in the district court is outlined in detail in legislation. 91 Once a
district court obtains the parties' consent, the Federal Magistrates Act
provides that a district court may delegate the power to conduct any
or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter to the magistrate
for decision.92 This delegation may occur at the parties' request or at
the court's initiative. If the parties consent, the magistrate has the
power to hear the case and order the entry of judgment. Appeals
from the magistrate's decision may be heard either by the district
court or the court of appeals.93
At the outset, attacks on the constitutionality of the Federal
Magistrates Act were common. 94 Upon receiving an adverse decision
from a magistrate, a party would challenge the authority of the
magistrate to hear the case, asserting that allowing magistrates to
preside over and enter judgment in federal cases violated Article III
of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the United
States in the federal courts and provides life tenure for federal judges.
Ultimately, courts concluded that the Act was constitutional for one
or more of the following three reasons. First, courts noted that
Article III was not implicated because the Act required that the
parties and the district court consent to the transfer of the case to the
Second, courts
magistrate before it could be transferred. 95
emphasized that Article III was not violated because the district court
96
retained extensive administrative control over the magistrate.
Finally, courts determined that the continuing availability of the

91. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1998).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1998).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1998).
94. See, e.g., Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 109 (2d Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette
Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d
32,34 (1st Cir. 1984).
95. See Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1519 (11th Cir. 1987); Gairola v.
Commonwealth of Va. Dept. of General Svcs., 753 F.2d 1281,1284-85 (4th Cir. 1985).

96. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,682 (1980).
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option of an Article III judge to hear the case cured any potential
Article III defects. 97
Parties have attempted to alter the magistrate's role in the
judicial system in the same way that they have tried to alter the

court's role elsewhere. In DDI Seamless CylinderInt'l v. GeneralFire
Extinguisher Corp.,98 parties in a breach of contract case that had
been assigned to a magistrate attempted to settle the case, using the

magistrate to facilitate their negotiations. When negotiations reached
impasse, the parties decided to appoint the magistrate as an
arbitrator. 99 Acting as an arbitrator, the magistrate found in favor of
the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that the parties did not
have the power to appoint the magistrate as an arbitrator.

The

Seventh Circuit agreed that acting as an arbitrator is not part of a
magistrate's job description, but upheld the magistrate's decision on
other grounds.1°

Unlike other statutes examined in this section, 28 U.S.C. § 636
provides significant detail, carefully outlining a magistrate's job
duties. A review of 28 U.S.C. § 636 suggests that while a magistrate
may enter a judgment, she may not enter an arbitration award.' 01 The
97. See Geras, 742 F.2d at 1042.

98. 14 F.3d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1994).
99. The parties drafted an order that articulated the agreed procedure for the
arbitration. The parties were to select an independent auditor to determine the actual
losses each party sustained when General Fire repudiated its contract to purchase a large
amount of metal cylinders used in fire extinguishers from DDI. If either party disagreed
with the auditor's findings, the magistrate would retain jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute
and make a decision that would bind the parties. See hL
100. See id. at 1168.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) outlines the various activities in which a magistrate judge may
engage. For example,
a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on
the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or
information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.
Id. Section 636(b) goes on to describe more activities in which a magistrate may
participate. Although Congress never explicitly confers power on a magistrate to act as an
arbitrator, section 636(b)(3) allows a magistrate to be assigned such additional duties "as
are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." This provision
would seem to allow a federal court to assign additional duties to the magistrate but does
not seem susceptible of an interpretation that would allow parties to request that the
magistrate engage in additional duties. But see Ovadiah v. New York Ass'n for New
Ams., 1997 WL 342411, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1997) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court broadly interprets section 636(b)(3) and that section 636 does not "expressly
foreclose" the possibility that a magistrate judge could act as an arbitrator).
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Seventh Circuit, in analyzing parties' request that a magistrate act as
an arbitrator, provides a thorough explanation of why this is the case.
As the court correctly points out, if a magistrate could act as an
arbitrator, a conflict of interest would develop. On day one, the
magistrate would act as a magistrate and encourage the parties to
arbitrate. On day two, he would act as an arbitrator and resolve the
dispute. Then, on day three, "wearing his magistrate's hat" again, he
would confirm the arbitration award. 1°2 As the court emphasized, this
process is "so remote from the procedures that federal judicial
officers are authorized to use that the final order emanating from it
might well be void" and therefore unappealable under Article II.103
Moreover, the magistrate's confirmation of the arbitration award he
previously issued would be a clear conflict of interest and, as such, a
threat to the integrity of the judicial system.
No other courts have addressed the question of whether the
parties may consent to employ a full-time magistrate as an arbitrator.
Yet at least one other court sensibly approved the analysis used in
DDI Seamless Cylinder. In Hameli v. Nazario,1°4 a Delaware district
court cited DDIwith approval when it considered whether the parties
could agree to have a magistrate act as a hearing officer to make a
final and unappealable determination of plaintiff's wrongful discharge
claim. While the Hameli court decided that issue on other grounds, 0 5
the court agreed that "arbitration is not in the job description of a
1° 6
federal judge, including (see 28 U.S.C. § 636) a magistrate judge.'
Applying the analysis of the magistrate statute to the issue of
whether parties may agree to nontraditional exercises of judicial
action sheds light on the question of whether courts should grant such
requests in the absence of Congressional authorization. In all of these
cases, parties have agreed to have a third party neutral do something
that Congress has not explicitly authorized him to do. In the
magistrate case, inconsistency of the request and the statutory scheme
was correctly considered fatal-a magistrate's arbitral award cannot
be enforced because a magistrate judge does not have the authority to
act as an arbitrator. Thus, the inconsistency of a request with the
existing statutory scheme suggests that it should be rejected. Of
102. DDISeamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1165-66.
103. Id. at 1166.
104. Hameli v. Nazario, 930 F.Supp. 171,181 (D. Del. 1996).
105. The Hameli case turned on the fact that the magistrate's hearing encompassed only
state law claims over which the federal court had no jurisdiction. In the absence of a basis
for supplemental jurisdiction, the court rejected the magistrate's findings. See id. at 183.
106. Id. at 181 (citing DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1165).
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course, the Federal Magistrates Act contains a thorough statutory
scheme not present in many of the other cases. Thus, it may be that
the inconsistency of a request within a statutory scheme is fatal only
when the statute specifically outlines the limitations on the decisionmakers' duties.
H. Appropriate Standards Governing Party Management
Authority Over Courts
A review of judicial treatment of party requests for consent
decrees, summary jury trials, requests for vacatur and requests for a
magistrate to act as an arbitrator indicates that courts generally agree
that when evaluating party requests, courts must first identify
statutory authority granting them the power to approve the request.
Once such authority is identified, courts then adopt a variety of
processes designed to ensure that granting the parties' requests does
not inappropriately undermine the court system. It is in making this
inquiry that courts do not agree on a single method for evaluating
party requests. With consent decrees, courts hold fairness hearings;
while with requests for vacatur, courts conduct what they label an
independent evaluation of the parties' request. The question, then, is
what method is best-suited to evaluating the propriety of granting
party requests.
Professor Judith Resnik, in an article examining the propriety of
granting requests for vacatur, suggested that the decision whether to
grant litigants' non-traditional requests depends on when the
importance of allowing parties to retain a bargaining chip outweighs
"social investments" such as third party interests, the system of stare
decisis and the position of courts as institutions within society.107 In
her view, the argument that certain party requests, such as requests
for vacatur, are inconsistent with the role of the courts in society,
must be rejected not only because similar practices such as the
consent decree exist, but also because contemporary law diminishes
the role of formal adjudication in favor of a public policy supporting
settlement. 108
Like the various judicial approaches, this approach fails because
it ignores the fundamental and immutable role of the court in the
judicial process. We may well be in an era that celebrates settlement;
nevertheless, fundamental limitations remain that curb a court's
107. Resnik, supra note 31, at 1525.
108. See id. at 1477.
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discretion to grant parties' requests. As Professor Resnik concedes at
one point, "[h]owever much judges have blurred the lines between
themselves and the host of dispute resolution providers out there,
they retain this fundamental and distinguishing attribute:
authority."'10 9 It is this distinguishing attribute that mandates
limitations on the court's exercise of power, regardless of the parties'
wishes.
Of course, in a private context, parties have substantial freedom,
subject to contract limitations, to develop whatever dispute resolution
system they want.10 They can choose whether to utilize rules of
evidence or procedure and can select the dispute resolution
mechanism of their choice, or create a new method for resolving their
dispute. Yet parties' freedom to tailor the decision-making process
should be circumscribed when the parties attempt to involve the
court. While the court's role in adjudication is somewhat flexible, it
can only be stretched to the limits imposed upon it by rule or statute.
The idea that the court should balance litigants' interests against
other social investments is not a viable theory because such balancing
undermines the court's institutional integrity. The court has an
immutable obligation to make certain both that it is acting
consistently with the authority Congress and the Constitution has
granted to it and that it is safeguarding the integrity of the judicial
system as an institution."' Regardless of parties' interests, the court's
obligation to these tenets cannot be compromised.
Because parties' bargains have begun to include requests for
courts to exercise public power, a proper framework for reviewing
party requests for non-traditional exercises of judicial power in the
dispute resolution process must be adopted. The development of
such a process is essential not only to address the public policy
concerns raised by parties' agreement for judicial involvement, but
also for several additional reasons. First, consistent treatment of
party requests would not only resolve the question of whether courts
109. Id. at 1532.
110. Private ADR is less problematic than the other party requests discussed herein. It
is voluntary and consumes few, if any, judicial resources. See Posner, supra note 28, at 392.
111. While a court must be careful to act constitutionally and within the statutory
authority granted to it by Congress, there is no concern in the arbitration context that the
courts are exceeding the power granted to them by the Constitution. Whether the courts
are exceeding the power granted to them by Congress is a more difficult question. While
the language of the FAA suggests that honoring parties' agreements to expand judicial
review of arbitral awards is inconsistent with the FAA's judicial review scheme, the
language is sufficiently vague that the opposite conclusion is possible. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)

(1992).
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should grant party requests to expand judicial review of arbitral
awards, but also would create doctrinal consistency for the judicial
treatment of all party requests. This development would, in turn,
increase faith in the legal system and in the continued use of ADR
mechanisms. Second, consistent treatment will likely increase the
probability that litigants will utilize ADR processes. Variable
treatment of party agreements decreases certainty and discourages
party use. Third, the approach would likely reduce ambiguity in party
requests, which creates unnecessary costs for the courts. Fourth, the
approach would reduce the likelihood that the court would
undermine its own integrity by approving a request that sanctions
illegal conduct or which otherwise undermines the court's dignity.
Any proposed mechanism for evaluating litigant requests must
address the potential problems that are raised when a court's
enforcement of such requests are predicated on notions of party
consent and autonomy. This Article has identified three potential
concerns resulting from a court's approval of a non-traditional
request for judicial involvement in dispute resolution. First, that
approving a request that is inconsistent with an existing statutory
scheme would be unlawful. Second, that approving a request that
contemplated a non-traditional exercise of judicial power may tend to
undermine institutional integrity. Third, that approving a request
would impose undue costs on the court and waste the court's scarce
resources. At the approval stage, a trial court should be able to
eliminate or at least minimize the effects of the first two concerns by
utilizing the following two-prong test: (1) Is the litigants' request
statutorily permissible? (2) If so, does the litigants' request
undermine the institutional integrity of the courts? The third factor,
whether the litigants' request imposes undue costs on the courts or
third parties should not be utilized in light of the uncertainty that
accompanies such an inquiry. Using the waste or conservation of
resources as the justification for granting or rejecting parties'
requests, without first testing whether judicial assumptions on this
score are empirically valid, is too subjective to provide meaningful
guidance to the courts or the
A. Does the Statute Permit the Court to Grant the Parties' Request?

Any proposed request must first satisfy existing legal constraints
on the exercise of judicial power." 2 In the absence of statutory
112. See Posner, supra note 28, at 385.
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authorization, the parties' request must be rejected. Whether
authorization exists is a question that can only be answered using a
case by case analysis of relevant statutes.
In the summary jury trial context, for instance, the question was
whether a court has statutory authority to empanel summary jurors
and conduct a summary jury trial. In the absence of a statute on

point, courts turned to various civil procedure rules addressing
judicial involvement in settlement in an attempt to determine whether

the use of a summary jury trial could be justified. Some courts found
justification for the adoption of the summary jury trial process in the
court's inherent powers and/or in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1
and 16.113 Other courts rejected these interpretations, holding instead
that courts are not authorized to empanel summary jurors." 4
The question of whether courts have authority to conduct

summary jury trials was settled in 1998 when Congress passed the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.115 In that Act, Congress
stated that each United States district court "may authorize by local
rule the use of arbitration in any civil actions"" 6 and defined ADR
processes to include "something other than adjudication by a

presiding judge, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in
the resolution of issues in controversy.""n 7 This definition appears to

encompass the use of the summary jury trial. Thus, today there is
authority for a court to conduct a summary jury trial.
That Congress deemed it necessary to clarify by legislation that
courts have the authority to conduct summary jury trials at the
parties' request suggests that the courts holding that summary jury
trials were not statutorily authorized had the better of the argument.
113. See generally Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988);
Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988).
114. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
115. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1998). In fact, the issue may have been resolved even
earlier. In 1993, Federal Rule 16(c) was amended to read that "[a]t any conference under
this rule consideration shall be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with
respect to ... (9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the
dispute when authorized by statute or local rule .... " In the advisory committee notes
following the amendment, the drafters explained that the language was intended to allow
the parties and the judge to explore whether to use alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, such as the summary jury trial. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,NAT'L L.J., S3, S3-S5 (June 7,1993).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1998). While summary jury trials are not expressly included
within the definition of alternative dispute resolution processes, the definition provided is
not limited to the devices listed. That said, the statute might be construed to cover only
commonly-used alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1998).
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Moreover, both the court in Hume and Posner in his article presented
compelling arguments that neither the procedural rules nor a court's
inherent powers enabled courts to empanel summary jurors or
conduct summary jury trials." 8 In the absence of statutory
authorization, courts should have concluded that they did not have
the authority to conduct a summary jury trial.
In the magistrate context, the statutory analysis seemed to follow
an expressio unius est exclusio alterius theory. 119 Using this tool of
statutory interpretation, courts find that omissions from a statute
should be understood as exclusions. 20 Moreover, some courts infer
that such omissions are intentional.' 2 ' Implicitly applying this theory,
the Seventh Circuit found that the statute authorizing federal
magistrates described with specificity the job of the federal
magistrate. 22 Because that detailed job description did not provide
that a magistrate could act as an arbitrator, and because such
behavior seemed inconsistent with the job of magistrate, the court
rejected the parties' request that the magistrate arbitrate their case.
The court seemed to read implicitly into the magistrates act that
anything not provided for in the Act was prohibited.
Ultimately, it is the court's job to interpret the applicable statutes
to determine whether it has the statutory authority to grant the
parties' request. There may be a specific statute, such as the Federal
Magistrates Act, that the court may examine. Or the court may have
to interpret several statutes or rules to determine whether it has the
authority. Because parties' requests tend to expand the court's role in
adjudication, a lack of clear authority may, as Judge Posner suggests,
be a reason for hesitation.123
B. Application of an Institutional Integrity Standard

Once the court has determined that it is permitted to exercise
judicial power, it must then address whether the parties have asked
118. See supra notes 52-75.
119. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" means that to express one thing is to exclude
others. NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 304-

19 (6th ed. 2000).
120. See id at 307. See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (holding that "when legislation expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to
subsume other remedies").
121. See SINGER, supranote 119, § 47.25, at 327.

122. See DDI Seamless Cylinder v. General Fire Extinguisher, 14 F.3d 1163, 1165 (7th
Cir. 1994).
123. See Posner, supra note 57, at 386.
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for a non-traditional use of judicial power that would undermine
institutional integrity. Imagine that the parties to a lawsuit sign an
agreement that authorizes the court to decide their dispute by flipping
a coin. If such an agreement were enforced, it would undermine the
integrity of the court as an institution by making it appear that courts
exist to serve the whims of litigants and make decisions without
regard to legal precedent. While courts exist in part to protect
litigants' rights, they can achieve that goal only if the public respects
the courts' authority. If courts begin to make decisions in an arbitrary
manner, as by deciding cases by the flip of a coin rather than by
consulting precedent, or by tricking citizens into thinking their
decisions as jurors count when they do not, the respect the public
currently has for the judiciary as a decision-maker will be dissipated.
To ensure the institutional integrity of the courts, then, courts must
act as principled decision-makers. The court's role as a principled
decision-maker requires it to reject party requests that tend to
undermine the court as an institution.
Some courts already implicitly consider the impact of a particular
124
request on "institutional integrity" before they grant the request.
This Article suggests that courts evaluating party requests make this
inquiry explicit-examining every party request to determine if it
requires the court to act as an unprincipled decision-maker. At first
glance, this inquiry might appear amorphous. Yet courts have
successfully utilized the institutional integrity concept in several areas
of law. For example, some courts evaluating litigant requests have
cited "institutional integrity" as the justification for using their
inherent power to guard against abuses of the judicial process. 125
124. See, e.g., Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 651 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the court's inherent powers may be used to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process); Hume v. M & C Managment, 129 F.R.D. 506, 507 (N.D. Ohio
1990) (ruling that the use of summary jurors could compromise the integrity of the judicial
system); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 867 F. Supp. 1278,1286 app. A (E.D.
Tex. 1994) (holding that federal court enforcement of settlement agreements is limited to
cases where breach of agreement challenges the institutional integrity of the court).
125. Courts also use the term "institutional integrity" in other contexts. For example,
courts cite "institutional integrity" when discussing whether a non-Article III court can
hear a case traditionally resolved by an Article III court. Thus, in Commodities Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, the Court held that allowing an administrative agency to hear a
private law claim would not threaten the "institutional integrity" of the judicial branch and
was therefore constitutionally permissible. In this context, then, the Court's use of the
phrase "institutional integrity" is designed to ensure that the judicial branch, as one of the
three powers constituting the federal government, is not undermined by other institutions
attempting to perform functions reserved to the judicial branch by the Constitution. See
Commodities Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,850-56 (1986).
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Thus, courts issue contempt citations, sanctions, default judgments
and dismissals in order to protect the integrity of the court as an
institution. In other instances, courts cite institutional integrity to
reject party requests that would undermine the position of respect the
court as an institution currently maintains. Thus, institutional
integrity is offered as one of the reasons not to allow courts to
empanel summary jurors.126

The court's unstated goal in applying an integrity standard is to
ensure that parties obey judicial authority and respect judicial
decision-making power. In other words, institutional integrity is the
phrase courts utilize when they are concerned that particular action
by a litigant would serve to undermine public confidence in the
judicial system. If the institutional integrity of the courts is
threatened-as it might be if parties are permitted to dictate to the
courts how they are to make decisions-the public may lose respect
for the court as a principled decision-maker. Following the parade of
horribles to its logical conclusion, the consequence of this loss of faith
would be future unwillingness to abide by judicial decisions and,
ultimately, anarchy.
Adoption of an institutional integrity review should ensure that
courts systematically consider whether a particular request threatens
the court's institutional stature. If courts routinely engage in such
inquiries, party proposals will be given the scrutiny they deserve and
courts will have a basis for rejecting party requests that would
embarrass the court or in any other way undermine the court's
position as a principled decision-maker.
C. Courts Should Not Consider Whether the Parties' Request Wastes or
Conserves Scarce Judicial Resources

In evaluating litigant requests, courts often consider how the
request will impact the court's scarce resources. 127 In making this
determination, the court attempts to balance how much the litigants'
request will increase costs in the short term by requiring greater court
involvement with the savings that increased settlement rates will bring
over the long term. Although a court may ultimately draw a
conclusion about whether the request is an appropriate allocation of
126. See Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 508 n.3 (citing Richard Posner, The Summary Jury Trial
and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations,53
U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986) (explaining that summary jury trial may undermine judicial
system by causing jurors to become less conscientious)).
127. See generally Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987);
In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299,1300-01 (7th Cir. 1988).
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the court's scarce resources, it is often quite difficult to comprehend
the reasons underlying the court's decision. Perhaps that is because
the court's "decision" on this issue is little more than an educated
guess about the likelihood that a particular mechanism will increase
settlement rates. While one might be inclined to criticize the courts
for adopting a method so devoid of reason, it is hard to condemn
them since for some time, many commentators and courts have
assumed that any mechanism designed to settle cases would save
courts money.12 In fact, it is no longer clear that such an assumption
is warranted. For example, Judge Posner's empirical study of the
summary jury trial (which he described as "crude") suggested that
summary jury trials waste court resources because settlement rates
129
may not increase sufficiently to offset the increased costs.
Until there are empirical studies supporting the hypothesis that
litigants' requests are an efficient use of court resources, courts should
not base decisions to grant such requests on the theory that the
request might conserve court resources. Some of the existing
literature analyzing whether particular ADR mechanisms conserve or
waste court resources may assist in understanding why courts should
not consider the resources issue. That reasonable minds appear to
differ greatly in their assessment of whether particular litigant
requests for non-traditional exercises of judicial power are efficient
suggests that a resources inquiry would be futile.
For example, two eminent law and economics scholars have
offered opposing views regarding the efficacy of requests for vacatur.
According to Judge Winter of the Second Circuit, a decision not to
vacate a judgment wastes both the litigants and the court's resources
by requiring the continuation of litigation that could have been
settled. 30 Thus, requests for vacatur should be granted because they

128. See Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 16 (1990) (discussing the
remarkably high settlement rates when summary jury trial is used); Kramer, supra note 34,
at 328 (stating that in the absence of empirical evidence, the "better assumption" is "that
consent decrees are worth the effort needed to enforce them").
129. Posner, supra note 57, at 377; see also Wiegand, supra note 57, at 101-02 (writing
that summary jury trials are a waste of resources if the case would have settled anyway).
130. See Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985).
Professor Resnik noted that Federal Circuit judges adopted Judge Winter's position,
asserting that refusing to vacate as a condition of parties' settlements is both "unjust" to
the parties and "wasteful of the resources of the judiciary." Resnik, supra note 31, at 1522
(citing Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prod. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 280 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
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save court resources.13 ' By contrast, Judge Easterbrook, analyzing
the same problem, came to the opposite conclusion.132 He reasoned
that rejecting requests for vacatur creates an incentive for parties to
settle their cases before judgment. 133 Even if the parties do not settle,
the incremental additional costs to the parties and the judiciary to go
to judgment and hear an appeal do not justify the request for vacatur
practice in light of its abundant shortcomings.
Moreover,
Easterbrook suggests that costs to future litigants and courts will be
avoided if the vacatur practice is rejected since they can rely on the
precedent set by the parties who are not permitted to vacate the
court's judgment. 34
Under the Winter theory, vacatur is efficient. The costs the
judiciary incurs by approving requests for vacatur do not outweigh
the benefits of facilitating settlement. After all, the court saves the
cost of an appeal and is confronted only by the threat of costs that
might be incurred if future litigation on the same subject arises. Yet
under Easterbrook's approach, vacatur is inefficient. If a party can
file a motion for vacatur, an incentive to settle early may be lost.
Moreover, granting a vacatur request will save few court resources.
Occurring as they do after a final judgment is rendered, granting a
vacatur request saves only the cost of hearing an appeal. Moreover, if
future litigation on the same subject transpires, the minimal resources
conserved by avoiding the appeal may well disappear and additional
costs may accrue. Although Winter characterizes the likelihood of
future litigation as a "nebulous threat," the fact that one party is
intent upon eliminating precedent suggests that the judgment vacated
involves a dispute that is fairly likely to be litigated again in the
135
future. Thus, resources expended are greater than those saved.

131. See Nestle Co., 756 F.2d at 284.
132. See In re MemorialHosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
133. See id. at 1303. Another commentator agreed that granting vacatur requests may
discourage early settlement because a party might proceed to judgment with the intent of
obtaining a settlement conditioned upon vacatur of the judgment in order to preserve the
right to relitigate, if necessary. Henry E. Klingeman, Note, Settlement PendingAppeal:
An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 233,244 (1989).
134. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303. Another court emphasized that
vacatur is problematic because it "provide[s] the dissatisfied party with an opportunity to
relitigate the same issues." Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686
F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982). Obviously, relitigation increases costs.
135. See Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 721; William D. Zeller, Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion
by Settlement Conditioned upon the Vacatur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE LJ. 860, 868
(1987) (explaining that a wealthy party may forego settlement for trial knowing it may
obtain vacatur as a term of settlement, allowing subsequent relitigation).
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What this analysis demonstrates is that it is difficult to draw a
firm conclusion about the efficacy of the vacatur practice in the
absence of empirical evidence. Posner's analysis of the efficiency of
the summary jury trial bolsters the argument that resources questions
cannot be resolved in the absence of further serious study.
Shortly after the summary jury trial was introduced, Posner
conducted a rough empirical study of its effect on settlement rates.
The intent of the summary jury trial is to conserve scarce judicial
resources by facilitating disposition in those cases where negotiations
have reached an impasse. 36 The theory is that litigants who utilize
the summary jury trial will be better able to assess their probability of
success at trial because they obtain better information about the
trial's likely outcome following the summary jury trial.137 Once they
have obtained better information, the theory goes, they are likely to
be capable of breaking their negotiation impasse and settling their
case. 138 Posner tested this theory by engaging in a limited study of
settlement rates in the Northern District of Ohio where the summary
jury trial had been used for five years, comparing those rates with
rates from the same district before the summary jury trial process was
introduced as well as to the Southern District of Ohio and the
remaining districts within the Sixth Circuit. 139 After analyzing the
data, Posner concluded that the settlement rate in the Northern
District of Ohio was not affected by the use of the summary jury trial
and, in fact, a decline in the number of cases tried in the Northern
District that had begun before the summary jury trial was introduced,
stopped after its introduction. 14° As Posner points out, this result is
the "opposite of what one would expect if the device raises the
settlement rate.' 41 Average time from filing to disposition of a civil
case did not improve in the Northern District following the summary
jury trial introduction, nor did the use of the summary jury trial
increase the number of cases terminated. 142 Ultimately, Posner's
study suggests that the summary jury trial may not be an appropriate
136. See Kaufman, supra note 128, at 16.
137. See Posner, supra note 57, at 371.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 377.
140. See id. at 379 (pointing out that the decline in the number of civil trials in the
Northern District began years before the summary jury trial was introduced and "leveled
off after its introduction").
141. Id.
142. See id. at 380 (showing that the average time from filing to disposition went from
6.4 months prior to the introduction of the summary jury trial to 7.8 months following its
introduction).
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allocation of judicial resources because it may not increase the
likelihood of settlement. A device that increases costs for the court
without the corresponding benefits of increased settlement is an
improvident commitment of judicial resources.
Some commentators have suggested that the summary jury trial
process, because it is fairly expensive in terms of court time and other
resources, should be reserved for complex cases that would take
weeks or months to try.143 While this may be true, Posner's study
does not necessarily support this assumption. According to Posner,
the summary jury trial owes its limited success to those judges who
decide when and under what circumstances to use it. Posner suggests
that if the device were widely utilized, it would be unlikely to result in
any significant savings because the maximum savings that could be
obtained, given the timing of the summary jury trial, is limited and the
increase in number of cases settled is not likely to be high, because
these are cases that could not be settled by any other device
available. 14
The summary jury trial experience does not provide much
support for the notion that litigant requested non-traditional uses of
judicial power are efficient allocations of judicial resources. Given
the amount of court time and resources required, in the absence of
proof of a high settlement rate, it would seem that a court could reject
parties' requests for summary jury trials on the ground that they are
not an efficient allocation of judicial resources.
Like the summary jury trial, the consent decree exists to facilitate
the settlement of cases that would otherwise go to trial. Settlement
would seem to conserve parties' resources, allowing them to obtain
more of what they want at a lower cost. Moreover, settlement would
seem to conserve the courts' scarce resources, allowing the courts to
allocate time to cases that do not settle voluntarily.

The difficulty with this theory is that there is no proof that
consent decrees facilitate settlement of cases that would not otherwise
settle or that judicial resources are conserved by granting consent
decrees. Several years ago, Professor Judith Resnik noted the
absence of empirical support for the notion that cases that settle

143. See

STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL.,

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION:

NEGOTIATION,

MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 235 (2d ed. 1992).

144. See Posner, supra note 57, at 380. Posner cites other studies that support his
conclusion such as a Federal Judicial Center study of the summary jury trial suggesting
that use of the device did not increase settlement rates. See id. at 377-82 (discussing
Federal Judicial Center study).
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through consent decrees would not have settled otherwise. 145
Moreover, she emphasized the lack of evidence supporting the theory
that consent decrees actually conserve judicial resources. 46 While it
is true that decrees end the case, parties can return to court to modify
the decree, interpret the decree's language, or determine whether
there has been a violation of the decree, among other things. Once
these potential additional costs are considered, the picture of the
consent decree as a cost-savings device becomes muddied.
Some commentators suggest that the lack of empirical evidence
supporting the efficiency of consent decrees should not dissuade
courts from entering them.147 According to Professor Larry Kramer,
the "better assumption" is that "consent decrees are worth the effort
needed to enforce them." Kramer suggests that because consent
decrees help settle some cases that would not otherwise settle and are
frequently enforced through use of the court's cheap and efficient
contempt sanctions process, they should be utilized even in the
absence of evidence supporting their efficiency. 48 Kramer also notes
that the evidence available supports the theory that consent decrees
are an "efficient allocation of judicial resources."' 149
Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence of the efficiency of consent
decrees is not strong support for the theory that consent decrees
actually conserve judicial resources. While it may be true that
consent decrees are a cost-effective device for obtaining settlements,
it may also be true that entering the consent decree is but a first step
in an on-going process of modification and clarification of the decree.
In the absence of empirical evidence, the grant or denial of a consent
decree will continue to be made on an ad hoe basis. While this
provides little certainty to parties, it is the only path currently
available to them.
As with summary jury trials and requests for vacatur, there is no
proof that allowing the entry of consent decrees will result in
145. See Resnik, supra note 31, at 67-69.
146. See id. at 70.
147. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 34, at 328; Mengler, supra note 33, at 321 (writing that
"[b]oth the parties and the judicial system benefit because a consent decree typically
consumes fewer resources").
148. See Kramer, supra note 34, at 329-30.
149. Id. (citing Neuborne & Schwarz, A Prelude to the Settlement of Wilder, 1987 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 180-81 (1987). See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of
Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725 (1986)
(describing a case study of three consent decrees); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18
LAW & Soc'Y REV.11 (1984).
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conserving scarce judicial resources. While courts can continue to use
resources as a factor to justify their decisions, in the absence of any
empirical study supporting the courts' conclusions, to do so would
seem to invite challenges on the basis that the courts' actions are
unprincipled. Rather than continue to use resources as a justification
for granting or rejecting parties' requests, perhaps a better approach
would be to consider first whether the parties' request falls within the
limits of the courts' authority and second, whether the request
requires the court to undermine institutional integrity.
I. Application to Parties' Agreements to Expand Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards
This Article outlines a test that courts could adopt when
confronted with party requests for non-traditional exercises of judicial
power. Rather than ad hoc determinations, this article suggests a
two-part test. First, the court should determine whether there is a
statute or rule authorizing it to grant the parties' request. Second, if
there is such authority, the court should ask whether the request
undermines the court's institutional integrity. If so, the court should
reject the request on this ground. At the present time, parties
commonly request expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.
Application of the test to arbitration should reveal both the test's
flaws and its countervailing benefits.
Before applying this test to parties' requests for expanded
judicial review of arbitral awards, the Article first examines how
judicial review became part of the arbitral process and how courts
have addressed parties' requests for application of non-traditional
judicial review standards to existing arbitration awards. Next, the
Article applies the two-part test to the arbitration problem and
concludes that the existing judicial analysis misses essential points
about the effect of the parties' agreements on the court's institutional
integrity.
A. Evolution of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
The issue of expanded judicial review of arbitral awards has
arisen only recently. To understand why this is the case, it is
important to understand how arbitration is structured and what
changes have occurred in arbitration that may have prompted such a
development.
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(1) ArbitralStructure

The word "arbitration" refers to any arrangement whereby

parties agree that a disinterested private party will fashion a binding
determination of a dispute that has arisen between them.150 The
parties select the arbitrator who will resolve their case, typically
making the selection after the dispute has arisen. 151 The parties'

active role in the selection process enables them to choose an
arbitrator who is an expert in the subject matter of the dispute.152

Traditional arbitration also involves flexible procedures. The parties
may choose the extent to which they wish to be bound by formal
procedural rules and may define their own procedure. 153 Arbitration

150. See WILNER, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1. A typical statutory definition of arbitration
appears in the Texas statute. According to the statute: "(a) Nonbinding arbitration is a
forum in which each party and counsel for the party present the position of the party
before an impartial third party, who renders a specific award. (b) If the parties stipulate in
advance, the award is binding and is enforceable in the same manner as any contract
obligation." TEX Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.027 (1987).
151. See WILNER, supra note 1, § 20.02, at 308-09. Sometimes the arbitrator who will
decide the dispute is named in the contract establishing arbitration as the dispute
resolution mechanism. See id. § 20.02, at 308. Other times, parties simply state that an
arbitrator provider organization, such as the American Arbitration Association, will
provide a panel of arbitrators from which an arbitrator will be chosen at the time the
dispute arises. See id. § 20.01, at 302-03. Of course, even the latter selection method is, at
some level of generality, one in which the parties select the arbitrator. They have simply
elected to assign their selection powers to an agent.
152. See IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.2 (1994) (stating
that arbitrator is expected to be an expert in the norms governing the resolution of the
dispute); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (noting that parties
select a particular arbitrator "because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning
the demands" and customs of the field from which the dispute originates). It may be that
in at least some cases, one of the parties will not want an expert to resolve the dispute. A
party who has departed from industry norms in his performance, for instance, might prefer
an arbitrator who is not an expert in the industry in which the party deals. In litigation,
parties theoretically have little or no direct control over the particular judge who will
decide their dispute. (Although plaintiffs do, of course, to a large extent control the
forum, and thus can direct cases to fora that are perceived as more beneficial to plaintiffs).
In arbitration, by contrast, a party might act opportunistically by selecting an arbitrator
the party considers predisposed to the particular argument the party will advance. In fact,
I have argued elsewhere that the possibility of opportunistic behavior in arbitrator
selection provides repeat players, with their better access to historical information, and
stronger incentives to influence the arbitrator, a decided advantage in the arbitral forum.
See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives andArbitration: The Case Against the Enforcement of
Executory ArbitrationAgreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449,453 (1996).
153. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration,63 IND. L.J. 425, 433-34
(1988).
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proceedings, for instance, need not follow the rules of evidence and
often limit, 154 or even eliminate, discovery. 155
These flexible procedures typically allow arbitration to proceed
more rapidly than traditional courtroom litigation. The time between
hearing and result is also shorter than in litigation because arbitrators
are not required to publish their decisions, and usually do not.15 6 It is
also uncommon to have a transcript of the proceedings. 157 Because
arbitrators rarely publish their opinions and are not obligated to
follow precedent, an arbitral decision can be expected within days or
weeks following the arbitration hearing.
154. See generally Uniform Arbitration Act § 7 (1955). The proposed revision of the
UAA gives the authority to order discovery to the arbitrators, unless the parties'
agreement indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 13(a) (Oct.
31,1997 Draft).
155. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., ARBrrRATION 217 (1996) (writing that "[a]nother
illustration of the relative informality of arbitration is the sharply limited availability of
discovery, both pre-trial and at the hearing itself"). The Uniform Arbitration Act does
not provide for any form of pre-trial discovery. In fact, only the arbitrator has the power
to order "discovery"-he may order it if he believes it is necessary to resolve the dispute.
Parties do not have a right to compel discovery. See id. at 218 (citing Uniform Arbitration
Act § 7). It is interesting to note that parties, when given the choice, tend to agree to
eliminate or reduce the amount of discovery, especially in light of the far-ranging
discovery that takes place in most formal judicial proceedings. The question emerges why
discovery is so different in the two systems. That is, why does our formal judicial system
allow for such wide-ranging discovery if it appears that litigants, when left to choose their
own rules, opt for less discovery? There are at least two possible explanations for this
deviation between the nature of discovery in the public and private dispute resolution
systems: [1] little or no discovery is the better rule in cases where parties have an existing
relationship (i.e., the typical arbitration case), but broad ranging discovery is more
appropriate in non-relationship based cases; or [2] the discovery rules enshrined in the
federal rules of civil procedure (and therefore also the civil rules of the vast majority of
states) resulted from a process of interest group capture, Le., by attorneys interested in
increasing fees.
156. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
598 (1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award."); see also Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding
that arbitrators have no obligation to explain their award in writing). The American
Arbitration Association's Commercial Arbitration Provisions contain a provision
requiring that arbitrators provide a written award to the parties, but do not require the
arbitrator to explain in writing or otherwise the reasons underlying that award. See also
EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B.

CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECrvE 324 (1997) (explaining that only in specialized

arbitrations, like labor, international commercial and maritime arbitrations, do arbitrators
routinely write opinions); MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 152, § 2.6.2, at 2:37 (stating that
arbitrators are not required to provide a written opinion with reasons supporting their
decision); WILNER, supra note 1, § 29.01, at 427 (stating that the parties to the arbitration
typically set the time within which the arbitrator must render his award).
157. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 640 (2d ed.
1996).
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Once the decision is issued, a party may appeal the arbitrator's
decision. Judicial review of arbitral awards, however, is quite
restricted. The FAA limits the grounds for refusing to enforce an
arbitral award to procedural irregularities in the arbitral decisionmaking process, as when the arbitrator has acted in excess of her
authority.158 Misunderstanding or misapplication of the law are not
bases upon which an arbitral award may be reversed. 59
(2) TraditionalArbitration

Arbitration as we know it was developed by the merchant class in
medieval western Europe. 16° In the medieval period, merchants
traveled to fairs where they would meet and conduct business with
other merchants. Because these fairs occurred far from the
merchants' homes, and because the merchants did not stay at any
particular fair very long, it was imperative that the merchants create a
system to resolve the disputes that would inevitably arise from the
business conducted at the fair. Unfortunately, the common law court
system was not an appropriate venue for the resolution of these
disputes because of its complex and drawn-out procedures.' 6'
Moreover, the common law courts had little understanding of the
customary norms the merchants followed. 62
Merchants were interested in a system that would resolve
disputes (1) quickly (so they could leave the fairs) and (2) in
accordance with industry standards (to facilitate continuing
relationships among the parties). Arbitration was utilized in order to
achieve these twin goals. Thus, the arbitral system permitted parties
to appoint a disinterested third party who was an expert in the
industry to resolve the dispute in order to ensure that resolution was
achieved in accordance with understood customary norms1 63 In
158. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (1994).
159. Federal courts have created additional bases for judicial review of arbitral awards.
See Hayford, infra note 190.
160. An early form of arbitration as a means to resolve disputes was created long before
English merchants began to use it. Roman and Greek merchants utilized arbitration to
resolve disputes, as did the German and the French. See WILNER, supra note 1, § 2.02, at
15.
161. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitrationin United States Law, 40
ME. L. REV. 263, 268 (1988) (emphasizing that commercial relationships fared much
better under a system that focused on salvaging relationships among the parties rather
than on ensuring that stringent procedural safeguards were followed).
162. As Blackstone emphasized, arbitration was useful in settling mercantile
transactions that were "almost impossible to be adjusted on a trial at law." 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 17.

163. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy:

The Case of Arbitration
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order to ensure finality, so that the parties could return home with
relationships intact, the parties also agreed that they would abide by
the arbitrator's resolution of the claim. 64
This process, with its finality and lack of formalism, provided the
swift results the parties desired. Moreover, the inability to appeal an
arbitral award provided the finality the parties needed to preserve
existing business relationships. Interestingly, even if the parties had
not agreed that the arbitrator's decision was final, judicial
involvement would nevertheless be unnecessary in mercantile
arbitration because both parties have an incentive to avoid selfserving behavior. 165 The value of the parties' ongoing relationship, as

well as the reputational interest of each party within the industry,
vastly outweighs the stakes at issue in any particular case. 166 Thus,
parties willingly abided by arbitration decisions in order to preserve
their relationship and their respective reputations.
It is not surprising then that the structure of mercantile

arbitration was entirely contractual. Allocation of important issues
was left to the parties, in part because the regulatory powers were not
interested in regulating the arbitration process, 167 and in part because
informal marketplace sanctions served the enforcement role that
regulation often plays today. Yet market sanctions work best when
markets consist of relatively few players with frequent business
interactions, thus maximizing the importance of reputational
concerns. 168 As the market grew wider and more impersonal, market
sanctions became less effective. At that point, the commercial
community turned toward the courts to assist them in their efforts to
Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ. 259,271 (1990).
164. See id.
165. Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and
the Law of ContractFormation,89 MICH. L. REv. 215,281 (1990).
166. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System" Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STuD. 115, 149 (1992) (noting that the
diamond industry ensures obedience to arbitral awards through reputational sanctions).
167. The English courts in the medieval period had little interest or expertise in
commercial disputes. See Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior's Case to Mitsubishi: The
Future of ArbitrationandPublic Law, 12 BROOK. INT'L L.J. 583, 583-84 (1986) (suggesting
that merchants preferred arbitration to litigation because they believed the King's courts
were not well versed in commercial matters).
168. Bruce Mann, in his extensive study of arbitration in pre-revolutionary Connecticut,
emphasized the same phenomenon. According to his study, the success of arbitration is
dependent on the existence of a community. Once community bonds weaken, community
norms are no longer sufficient to ensure compliance with arbitration decisions. When that
weakening occurs, the inability of parties to obtain enforcement of arbitral awards in court
becomes problematic. See Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law:
ArbitrationBefore the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984).
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bypass the traditional legal system in favor of a more efficient system

of arbitration. Unfortunately, until Congress passed the FAA, the
courts refused to assist the merchants in this endeavor because they
firmly believed that arbitration agreements and awards oust the
courts of jurisdiction and, therefore, are unenforceable. 169
(3) ArbitrationAfter the FederalArbitrationAct

In the United States, as in England, by the early nineteenth
century, arbitration had become the standard method for resolving
commercial disputes.170 Yet American courts, following the ouster
doctrine, 171 were hostile toward pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate,
consistently refusing to enforce them.172 Arbitral awards received less
hostile, albeit inconsistent judicial treatment. Most state courts were
willing to enforce arbitral awards as long as nothing "egregious" had
occurred during the arbitration. 7 3 The United States Supreme Court
169. See Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth
Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 283 (1926). See also
Frances T. Freeman Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 519, 556 (1960) (characterizing courts as hostile to finality of arbitral
awards). But see MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 152, at 4:7 ("[U]nsatisfactory though they
may have been, these regular actions of the common law were indeed available at an early
date to enforce awards. The judicial hostility... respecting agreements to arbitrate did
not extend to the enforcement of awards.").
170. Despite judicial hostility toward arbitration, the use of arbitration thrived as long
as informal sanctions were effective. For example, in 18th century New York, the hub of
commercial activity, the New York Chamber of Commerce established procedures
allowing members to submit any disputes to arbitration committees, which were made up
of other chamber members. The Chamber used its influence over its membership to
ensure the enforceability of both agreements to arbitrate and the subsequently issued
arbitral awards. See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 152, § 4.3.1.2., at 4:14.
171. "Ouster" is the shorthand term for the belief that arbitration improperly ousts the
courts of jurisdiction and is therefore impermissible. See Sarah Rudolph, Blackstone's
Vision of AlternativeDispute Resolution, 22 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 279,290 (1992).
172. See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065)
(explaining that common law policy is not to enforce arbitration agreements); Insurance
Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445,451 (1874) (holding that agreements made in advance
to oust the courts of jurisdiction are illegal and unenforceable); Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90
F. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1898) (holding that agreement to oust courts of jurisdiction is
unenforceable because the parties cannot "seek to accomplish what the law forbids, the
complete abrogation of the authority which it has conferred upon the courts"); Wood v.
Humphrey, 114 Mass. 185, 186 (1873) (indicating that because an agreement to arbitrate
ousts the courts of jurisdiction, it is void); Trott v. City Ins. Co., 24 F. Cas. 215,217 (C.C.D.
Me. 1860) (No. 14,189); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co., 222 F. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (holding that arbitral agreement is void as it ousts
the courts of jurisdiction); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 139 N.E. 95, 98-99 (Il1. 1923) (holding that
an executory agreement to arbitrate is void under an arbitration statute requiring an
existing controversy).
173. See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 152, § 4.3.2.1, at 4:16. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Allen,
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approved this position, stating that "[i]f the [arbitral] award is within
the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators,
after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set
it aside for error, either in law or fact."'174
Yet not all jurisdictions viewed the arbitral award review process
favorably. In fact, some state legislatures attempted to alter the
traditional arbitral review process. For example, a 1917 Illinois
statute attempted to integrate the arbitral system and the courts,
providing that arbitrators could decide questions of fact but had to
"submit any question of law arising in the course of the reference for
the opinion of the court" and that the court's opinion would bind the
arbitrators. 175 While the idea underlying this statute was to create a
more "perfect service" by letting arbitrators and courts allocate
decision-making based on areas of expertise, the reformers who
lobbied for the passage of the FAA believed that shifting legal
questions away from the arbitrators to the courts was "anathema"
and had to be reversed. 7 6 While the Illinois statute addresses the
initial arbitral determination rather than the review of the arbitral
award, the statute makes clear that the courts could not review
177
arbitral awards for anything but procedural irregularity.
By the 1920s, most states had rejected the Illinois approach,
leaving the determination of legal, as well as factual, issues to the
arbitrator and permitting review of arbitral awards for procedural
irregularity alone. In New York, for instance, courts were authorized
to vacate or modify awards only on the showing of "such
circumstances as corruption, partiality, specified kinds of procedural
misconduct, and 'where arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award,
78
upon the subject matter submitted, was not made.""
169 N.Y. 494, 496-97, 62 N.E. 575, 576 (1902) (applying state law, court refused to vacate

an arbitral award for mistake of law and noting that so long as the arbitrator does not
exceed his jurisdiction, engage in fraud, corruption or other misconduct affecting the
award, then the award is final).
174. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344,349 (1854).
175. Interestingly, the Illinois statute's provisions for judicial review were similar to
those contained in the English Arbitration Act of 1889. In that statute, arbitrators were

permitted to refer questions of law to the courts and courts were authorized to require
arbitrators to do so. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., Ch. 49, 200
(Eng.).
176. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 33 (1992).
177. Of course, it would be unnecessary to review for errors of law since the arbitrator
was not permitted to make legal determinations.
178. MACNEIL, supra note 176, at 35 (quoting N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2374 (Stover
1902)). It is worth noting that the 1920 New York arbitration statute dropped the
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Nevertheless,
hostility toward
pre-dispute
arbitration
agreements, together with inconsistent state law treatment of the
arbitral process, led the merchants and businesspeople interested in a
more consistent approach to arbitration to begin a concerted lobbying
effort. 179 This effort culminated in the passage of the 1920 New York
Arbitration Act and, more importantly the FAA's passage in 1925.180
The passage of the FAA was an acknowledgment that a purely
private approach was no longer workable in light of the developing
concerns about enforceability that the market was no longer
addressing. The primary purpose of the FAA was to ensure that predispute arbitration agreements were as valid and enforceable as any
other type of contract. To ensure enforcement, Congress included
two key provisions. First, the FAA allowed a party to obtain a stay of
litigation pending an arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration
agreement.181
Second, the FAA enabled enforcement of an
arbitration agreement by authorizing a party to an arbitration
agreement to file in federal district court a motion to compel the
other party to arbitrate.18 The FAA also contained provisions for
limited judicial review of arbitral awards, together with provisions
articulating the process for vacation or modification of arbitral
awards.

183

Thus, while still restricting judicial involvement, the FAA
created a more expansive role for courts than had existed with
mercantile arbitration.
Unlike mercantile arbitration, "FAA
arbitration" is a limited multi-tier dispute resolution process. That is,
there were multiple levels of review necessary largely because the
market's growth rendered it unable to provide the kind of sanctions
necessary to ensure that parties would abide by arbitration
agreements. 184 In other words, as informal sanctions became less
provisions for judicial review.
179. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 176 (describing the history of lobbying efforts
by merchants, culminating in passage of New York Arbitration Act and FAA).
180. In a separate work, MACNEIL ET AL. emphasize that modem arbitration
legislation, like the FAA, has two basic purposes: "(1) to provide the full legal
enforcement needed to make complying [with] arbitration agreements ... fully effective in
the legal sense and to enforce awards as made with only limited judicial review; and (2) to
subject arbitration to important, but limited, regulation." MACNEIL ET AL., supra note
152, § 5.1, at 5:1.
181. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
182. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
183. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-12 (1994).
184. Bruce H. Mann's Connecticut arbitration research supports this proposition.
According to Mann, as trade expanded, so did the number of merchants. The new
merchants were not familiar with industry norms. Thus, an increase in the number of
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effective, governmental regulation was necessary to ensure the

continued enforceability of arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards.

185

(4) Modem Arbitration

Recently, commercial entities have become interested in greater
judicialization of arbitration.186 By this, I mean that they are
including in their arbitration agreements provisions that expand
judicial review beyond the limits outlined in FAA § 10(a).187 Why
they are doing this is unclear. Perhaps merchants' interest in
expanding judicial review of arbitrators' decisions is a response to
society's increased skepticism toward arbitration. 188 Or, it may be
disputes arose as did the unwillingness of parties to abide by the resulting arbitral awards.
See Mann, supra note 168, at 472. According to Mann, "these changes in the business
community explain the sharp increase in the number of failed commercial arbitrations
mentioned in petitions after mid-century." Id.
185. See Kathleen M. Kelly, Introduction to the 1997 McGeorge Symposium on
ContractualArbitration,29 PAC. U.J. 177, 187 (1998); Richard E. Speidel, ContractTheory
and SecuritiesArbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1335, 1339 (1996).
186. See Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62

BROOK. L. REv. 1459, 1459 (1996). Brunet notes elsewhere that companies are more
interested in ensuring that an arbitrator correctly applies the law in order to "reduce the
risk of an arbitrator deciding the case 'equitably' or arbitrarily." BRUNET & CRAvER,
supranote 156, at 427.
187. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); see generally Syncor
Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug.
11, 1997) (per curiam) (pointing out that parties agreed that arbitration decision would be
reviewed for "errors of law"); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth.,
14 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that parties agree to judicial review of arbitral
award under "arbitrary and capricious" standard); New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec,
10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 59 (D. Mass. 1998) (stating that parties agreed to judicial review of
arbitral award for errors of law); South Wash. Assocs. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217, 219
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (pointing out that parties agree to same standard of review as is
used to review "findings of fact and conclusions of law by a Colorado District Court").
188. Society has grown increasingly suspicious of arbitration as a means for resolving
disputes, at least under certain circumstances. Mandatory binding arbitration, particularly
of statutory claims, has caused increasing controversy. Much attention has been focused
on whether the existing arbitral procedure provide sufficient procedural safeguards to
ensure that parties will be able to vindicate their statutory rights effectively. See, e.g.,
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and
Recommendations, 105 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-34 (June 3, 1994); EEOC Policy
Statement on Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a
Condition of Employment, No. 915.002, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-4 (July 10, 1997).
Self-regulatory organizations like the NASD and NYSE responded to criticisms of their
mandatory arbitration systems by amending their rules to eliminate the requirement that
"associated persons" trading on their exchanges had to agree to arbitrate all statutory
disputes arising out of their employment. See ADR Report (Sept. 16, 1998). Of course,
employers in the securities industry may still require their employees to agree to arbitrate
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that merchants no longer have simple commercial disputes that can

be decided by an arbitrator who is primarily an expert in industry
customs. 189 Today, merchants may have purely commercial, or purely
legal disputes, or a combination of both. If legal questions are at
issue, merchants might want to expand judicial review since
arbitrators are generally considered experts in particular industries
but not in the law. In other words, merchants might want to increase

the predictability of results where legal issues are pending while still
taking advantage of some of arbitration's benefits, such as speed and
efficiency.
Yet under the current system of review articulated in FAA
§ 10(a), parties do not have the power to cabin arbitrator discretion in
any meaningful way. Under section 10(a), a court may reverse an
arbitral award only under very limited circumstances. 190 Limited
review was initially perceived as a benefit of the arbitral process,
enhancing the efficiency of decision-making as well as insuring that
the arbitrator, often an expert in the subject matter of the dispute,
statutory claims as a condition of employment. See id. Bills have also been introduced in

Congress to ensure that pre-dispute arbitration agreements of employment discrimination
claims would no longer be permissible. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of
1997, S. 63, H.R. 983, 105th Cong. (1997).
189. See David Rudenstine, The Impact on the Arbitration Process of Arbitrating
Statutory Claims, in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW:
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSrrY 46TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

LABOR 260 (Bruce Stein ed., 1993) (stating that as the kinds of issues submitted to

arbitrators become more complex, parties' arbitrator selection process may be affected
because knowledge of industry norms will no longer be sufficient to justify selection of an
arbitrator).
190. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) lists four bases upon which a party may challenge an arbitral
award:

(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)
Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them; (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior

by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (4) Where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
In addition to the four statutory grounds set out in section 10(a), many of the federal
appeals courts permit challenge to an arbitral award based on or more of the following
grounds: manifest disregard of the law by the arbitrator, the award is arbitrary and
capricious, the award violates a clear public policy; the award fails to draw its essence from
the parties' contract, and the award is completely irrational. See Stephen L. Hayford, A
New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between
Reasoned Awards and the JudicialStandardsfor Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443,
450-51 (1998) (citing cases).
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was able to render a final decision that would not be disturbed by a
judge who is ignorant of the customs in the industry.191 Today,

arbitrators often are not considered experts in the subject matter of
the dispute they arbitrate because many disputes involve statutory
and legal claims rather than claims that can be resolved by examining
industry customs. 192 Moreover, concerns about arbitrator bias have
developed as the subject matter of the disputes submitted to

arbitration have changed. 193
In addition, parties to modern
arbitration often have widely disparate levels of experience with the
arbitral process. An institutional party, who chooses arbitration to
resolve all its disputes, may have an advantage over the party who
may utilize the arbitral process only once, and only because his
contract with the institutional party requires him to do so.194 In this

situation, the institutional party may develop informal relationships
with the arbitrator, creating an incentive for the arbitrator to find in

its favor. The "one-shot" party will not have an opportunity to
develop similar relations. Thus, realistic concerns about arbitrator
bias arise. 95 Moreover, one-shot players, unlike repeat players, care
about errors even if those errors are unbiased. Because they will not
participate in arbitration multiple times, error costs will not even out
over time. Thus, if a one-shot player is risk averse, it will prefer to
191. Viewed this way, the reluctance of judges to revisit arbitral decisions is not unlike
the deference awarded to corporate directors under the business judgment rule. See
LEWIS D.

SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY:

MATERIALS AND

40 (4th ed. 1998). The common notion underlying each is that a judge should
hesitate to substitute his judgment for that of a person more qualified either by expertise
or by the fact that the parties chose the alternate decision-maker. Similar notions underlie
the Chevron doctrine in administrative law, which cautions against judicial intervention
into agency decisions about statutory meaning. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National
Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
PROBLEMS

192. See A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, 91 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8, E-11 (May

11,1995).
193. See Hugh R. Combs & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Courts Examine WhetherJudicialReview
of ArbitrationAwards Can Be Expanded by Contract, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 19, 1996), at B5

(stating that in securities and franchise cases, customers or franchisees may question the
impartiality of the industry arbitrators); EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory

Arbitration,133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-4 (July 10,1997).
194. An individual who has few opportunities to negotiate agreements or litigate claims
is a "one-shot" player. Unlike the repeat player, the one-shot player is characterized by a
lack of organization and sophistication about negotiating contracts or engaging in private
dispute resolution. See Cole, supra note 152, at 452.
195. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 133 Daily Lab. Rep.

(BNA) E-4 (July 10, 1997) (stating that mandatory arbitration systems are inherently
biased against discrimination plaintiffs because the employer obtains a structural
advantage as a repeat player against the plaintiff, who is a one-shot player).
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avoid the uncertainty inherent in arbitration and prefer a regime that
allows more invasive judicial review.
As a result, many parties now believe that the limited review
outlined in FAA § 10(a) creates a risk of arbitrary and capricious, or
even biased, decision-making. Groups interested in reform of the
arbitral process often advocate the requirements of written opinions
and expanded judicial review of those opinions as a means to achieve
the fairness they believe is currently missing from the process. 196 This
concern, together with the expansion in the kind of disputes that may
be submitted to arbitration, may have caused an increase in parties'
desires for more predictability in outcomes that can be achieved by
more expansive judicial review.
Still another possibility exists. As commercial transactions grow
in size and amount, the disputes that arise from those transactions
similarly increase in magnitude. Under the single tier system of
traditional arbitration, parties were not concerned about any single
result since results would even out over time (i.e., parties were riskneutral). 197 As the stakes in a given case become higher, however,
merchants who might be risk neutral with respect to small disputes,
may become risk averse and want more predictable results. Thus, the
parties' desire to expand judicial review may simply be seen as a way
to constrain the uncertainty inherent in a single tier or limited multitier system.
Although there may be good reasons underlying parties' desires
to expand judicial review, such agreements are controversial because
they demand greater judicial oversight than Congress has currently
provided. Two questions must be answered in order to determine the
viability of parties' agreements to expand judicial review of arbitral
awards. First, does the Federal Arbitration Act permit parties to
contract for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards? Second, if
so, to what extent do alterations of the standard of review threaten
198
the courts's institutional integrity?
196. See Cole, supra note 152, at 447; see also A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship,supra
note 192.
197. This conclusion assumes unbiased errors in the decision-making process. So long
as arbitral errors are unbiased, parties have no cause for alarm over any single decision.
See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitrationand Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE LJ. 916, 922-23

(1979).
198. Not all arbitration awards are reviewed by federal courts. Where the transaction
does not involve interstate commerce and/or the parties cannot establish an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction, a state court will apply its own law to review an arbitral
award. Most states (35) apply the Uniform Arbitration Act to review arbitration awards.
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The courts have initially attempted to answer at least the first of
these questions as they have addressed whether parties may contract
for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards. Unfortunately, an
examination of the judicial analysis of the problem fails to yield a
unified, well-reasoned solution to the problem at hand.
B. Judicial Analysis of Parties' Ability to Obtain Enforcement of Contracts
For Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards

Three different approaches emerge from the case law analyzing
parties' ability to contract for expanded judicial review of arbitral
awards. Most courts have concluded that parties can agree to
expanded federal court review of an arbitration award. 199 At least
one court, the Seventh Circuit, rejected this conclusion, ruling instead
that parties cannot obtain greater federal court review than FAA
§ 10(a) provides. 200 A third approach would allow parties to contract
for expanded judicial review as long as the standard of review they
20
select is one that is familiar to the courts. 1
The Seventh Circuit approach, exemplified by Chicago
Typographical Union v. ChicagoSun-Times, Inc.,202 takes a very strict
See STEPHEN K. HUBER & WENDY TRAcHTE-HUBER, ARBITRATION:

CAsES AND

260 (1998). The existing review provisions of UAA § 12(a)(1)-(5) are
virtually identical to those in FAA § 10. Thus, answering the questions whether parties
can contract for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards in federal courts is also
instructive on the question of whether parties in a state court proceeding may agree to
expand judicial review of their arbitral award beyond the limits imposed by the UAA.
The UAA is currently under revision. Although the proposed Revised UAA initially
authorized parties to contract in their arbitration agreement for "judicial review of errors
of law in the arbitration award," the most recent draft deletes the provision on the ground
that its inclusion is too controversial. See Justin Kelly, Contract Review of Awards
MATERIALS

Provision Dropped from Latest Draft of UAA,

(Feb. 3, 2000),

available at

<http://www.adrworld.com>.
199. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Syncor Int'l Corp. v.
McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997).
200. More recently, the Eighth Circuit, in dicta, expressed reservations about the ability
of parties to contract to expand judicial review. See UHC Management Co., Inc. v.
Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998). Recognizing that there is a
difference between contracting for arbitral procedures and contracting for an Article IIn
court to review an arbitral decision, the court identified the issue as an "interesting
question" whose resolution was unnecessary at the present time. Id. at 998.
201. See Kyocera, 130 F.3d at 887-88. Judge Kozinski has stated that deciding whether
parties could contract for an "errors of law" provision in their arbitration agreement was
one of the more difficult questions he has encountered recently, and one which deserved
more scholarly attention. See Judge Alex Kozinski, Remarks at the 1998 AALS Annual
Meeting: Can/Should/Does Legal Scholarship Influence the Legal System (Jan. 9,1998).
202. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
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view of federal jurisdiction. Rejecting a union's suggestion that the
court should set aside the arbitrator's award if it was an
"unreasonable interpretation of the contract, '203 the Seventh Circuit
held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to review cases
beyond the strictures outlined in FAA § 10(a).
The court
distinguished between parties contracting for an appellate arbitration
panel to review the arbitrator's decision and an attempt to obtain
greater review in the federal courts than the FAA provides.
According to the court, while parties are free to contract for all the
private justice they might desire, they cannot contract for judicial
review of arbitral awards. In other words, the court stated, "federal
jurisdiction cannot be created by contract. ' '2°4
The flaw in this analysis is that it confuses jurisdictional
limitations with restrictions on the court's power to render decisions.
The Federal Arbitration Act does not create an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction. 205 In order to challenge an arbitral award, then, a
party must first establish either federal question or diversity
jurisdiction. 20 6 Thus, in Chicago TypograhpicalUnion, as in any other
case involving a challenge to an arbitral award, the question is not
whether the parties have created federal jurisdiction, but rather
whether the court has the power to grant review on bases other than
those identified in the FAA. In other words, the only question is
whether the substantive law governing the court's action, here the
FAA, allows the court to grant the parties' request. If the substantive
law permits the court to grant the parties' request, the court should
207
grant the request, absent any institutional integrity concerns.
The second approach takes a much broader view of federal
jurisdiction. Courts following this approach allow parties to contract
for whatever standard of judicial review they desire. In these cases,
203. Id. at 1507. The case is strange in that the parties do not appear to have contracted
to expand judicial review beyond the FAA's limited provisions. Instead, it appears that
the union was suggesting that the Seventh Circuit engage in a more expanded review of
the arbitrator's decision, one that would consider whether the arbitration award was based
on an "unreasonable interpretation of the contract." Id.
204. Id. at 1504.
205. The FAA is an anomaly in the field of federal jurisdiction because it does not
create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.
See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). In
order to challenge an arbitral award, then, the moving party must establish a basis for
federal jurisdiction outside of the FAA. Thus, any case in which a party is appearing in
federal court on a matter concerning arbitration is a case that could have been brought in
federal court if no arbitration agreement existed.
206. See id.
207. See supra notes 28,31, and 111.

1246

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51

courts acknowledge no limitations on the parties' ability to ask for, or
the court's ability to grant, different standards of review than those
listed in the FAA. For example, in the Fifth Circuit case, Gateway
Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,208 the parties
contracted for federal court review of any arbitral decisions rendered
in disputes between them on the basis of "errors of law."2 °9 The Fifth
Circuit held that the parties could agree by contract to expand federal
judicial review of their arbitration award. 210 The Gateway court
emphasized that the FAA's judicial review provision was a default
rule that parties could contractually avoid.21 ' Because the court
viewed FAA § 10(a) as providing default rules that could be altered
by contract, it did not consider whether contracting for expanded
judicial review caused any jurisdictional problems for the federal
court required to conduct the review.
Like the parties in Gateway, the parties in Kyocera contracted
212
for judicial review of arbitral decisions on the basis of errors of law.
The Kyocera court acknowledged that where parties are silent, the
reviewing court is limited to evaluating the award to determine if it
falls within one of the grounds set forth in FAA §10(a) or one of the
'21 3
common law exceptions, such as "manifest disregard of the law.
Where parties do specify different grounds for judicial review other
than those listed in section 10(a), however, the court held that "we
must honor that agreement. '21 4 In support of this conclusion, the
court relied both on its interpretation of the FAA's statutory purpose
and on recent Supreme Court decisions adopting a contractualist view
of arbitration, particularly Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of
21 5
Leland Stanford Jr. University.
208. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
209. See id. at 996.
210. Ignoring the parties' agreement, the district court had reviewed the arbitral award
using a "harmless error" standard rather than the "errors of law" standard the parties
selected. In addition to holding that the parties could choose their own standard of
review, the court also held that the court should apply the standard of review the parties
selected. See id.
211. See id. at 996-97.
212. The Kyocera agreement provided in full that: "[t]he Court shall vacate, modify or
correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal
Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous." LaPine Tech.
Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884,887 (9th Cir. 1997).
213. Id. The court did not articulate whether the limitation on greater review is
jurisdictional.
214. Id. at 888.
215. 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989). In Volt, the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes

August 2000]

1247

MANAGERIAL LITIGANTS?

According to the Kyocera majority, the FAA's purpose is to

216
enforce valid contractual provisions according to their terms.
Viewing arbitration in this light, the court held that any rules or

procedures the parties agree to should be enforced.

Thus, FAA

§ 10(a) is a default standard of review which the parties can, and here
did, supplement by contract.217 The Court emphasized that this result

was consistent with the strong federal policy in favor of enforcing
private arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms as

articulated in recent Supreme Court decisions such as Volt.218

What this argument ignores is that cases like Volt concern the

parties' ability to dictate by contract matters relating to the subject
matter and procedural rules of the arbitral proceeding, not the power

of the federal court to review any disputes arising out of such an
agreement. In Volt, for example, the issue was whether the parties
could agree that California law should be applied if a dispute arose

under their contract. The Court in Volt held that the parties' choice
of law provision should be honored even though that meant staying
the arbitration until the California court proceeding was concluded.

Like other cases before it, the Volt Court did not need to address the
question whether parties could expand the court's role in the review

process because Volt involved a question about the enforceability of
mutual obligations under a contract and whether an agreement to
abide by California law should be preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act. 219 Thus, Volt does not support an argument
extending federal jurisdiction since it stands merely for the

arising out of their contract and that California law would govern the determination of
such disputes. When a dispute arose, the Court honored the parties' choice of law
provision even though California law required a stay of arbitration pending the resolution
of court proceedings involving third parties not bound by the arbitration agreement. The
Court emphasized that the parties' privately negotiated agreements should be enforced
just like any contract, in accordance with its terms. See id. at 468.
216. See Kyocera, 130 F.3d at 889.
217. Id.
218. See id at 888 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-89). In Volt, the court held that parties
may not only limit by contract the issues to be arbitrated, but also may "specify by
contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted." Id.
219. Volt authorizes parties to contract both for the kinds of issues they want to
arbitrate and the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted. See Collins v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield, 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995). This freedom of contract "applies
only in the context of the arbitration itself." Id. at 641. Although the Collins court did
enforce the parties' agreement to expand judicial review beyond the FAA, it recognized
that Volt did not authorize this enforcement. Id.
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proposition that the contractual agreements of the 22°
parties regarding
arbitration governance issues should be enforceable.
The Kyocera court did give some consideration to the question of
whether the parties' alteration of the FAA standard of review
actually expands federal court jurisdiction as the Chicago
Typograhical Union court suggested. The court reasoned that
because the federal court could have been required to decide all

aspects of the dispute absent an arbitration agreement, 221 it is not an
expansion of the federal court's jurisdiction to review an arbitration
decision under an agreed standard of review 22 Because judicial
review of the arbitration decision is "a far less searching and time-

consuming inquiry than a full trial," the federal court, assuming it has
jurisdiction, can provide such review 3
Finally, the Kyocera court distinguished Chicago Typographical's
holding that parties cannot contract for judicial review beyond what
the FAA provides on the basis that the Seventh Circuit had simply

not given adequate consideration to the question. According to
Kyocera, because the reasoning underlying the Seventh Circuit's
"cryptic assertion" that parties cannot contract to expand federal
jurisdiction was not explained, the court's conclusion was likely dicta
and, failing that, wrong. 224

220. The Volt Court did state that "it does not follow that the FAA prevents the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the
Act itself." 489 U.S. at 479. Yet this statement is dicta and must be understood in the
larger context of the case, which addresses only the agreement of the parties as to how the
arbitration should proceed. The Court cautioned that the enforcement of the parties'
agreement was appropriate because it effectuated the contractual rights and expectations
of the parties "without doing violence to the policies behind the FAA." Id. at 479. This
article suggests that blind adherence to contract principles would, in part, do violence to
the FAA.
221. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983).
222. See Kyocera, 130 F.3d at 889 (quoting Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland
Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240,244 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). The Midland court asserted that the
FAA does not preclude the parties' agreement to expand the power of the reviewing court
because the parties could have brought their case in federal court initially. 584 F. Supp. at
244 (noting that the FAA does not create an independent basis for federal jurisdiction).
Finding neither a jurisdictional nor a public policy reason for precluding enforcement of
the parties' agreement, the court held that it should be enforced. See id. The purported
public policy was the desire to encourage efficiency in dispute resolution. The Midland
court found that this was not undermined by the parties' agreement because arbitration,
even with expanded review, was still "a far less searching and time-consuming inquiry than
a full trial." Id.
223. Kyocera, 130 F.3d at 889.
224. Id. at 890.
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Judge Kozinski's concurrence in Kyocera225 represents the third

approach, which considers whether courts have the ability to grant
parties' requests for expanded judicial review. In his concurrence,
Judge Kozinski articulated his concern that the cases allowing parties
to decide how their arbitration should be administered did not
naturally support a conclusion that the parties can dictate how the
courts should review the decision. Judge Kozinski stated, "I do not
believe parties may impose on the federal courts burdens and

functions that Congress has withheld." 226 Responding to this concern,
he reached the same conclusion as the majority, reasoning that any
case where parties agreed to expand judicial review could have been

in federal court absent the existence of the arbitration agreement.
Thus, Judge Kozinski concluded, "enforcing the arbitration
agreement-even with enhanced judicial review-will consume far
fewer judicial resources than if the case were given plenary
adjudication." 227
In sum, a review of the existing case law reveals disagreement

about the appropriate method for evaluating parties' agreements to
225. Id. at 891.

226. Id.
227. Id. Several state courts have also considered the propriety of allowing parties to
contract to expand judicial review of arbitral awards. At least three courts prohibit party
enlargement of statutory standards. See Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995); South Wash. Assocs. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217, 219 (Co. Ct. App. 1992);
Chicago Southshore & South Bend R.R. v. Northern Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 682
N.E.2d 156, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). Four other courts permit parties to expand the
standard of review. See NAB Constr. Corp. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 579 N.Y.S.2d
375, 375 (App. Div. 1992); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 919 (Cal. 1992);
Primerica Fin. Servs. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631, 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Tretina Printing,
Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 640 A.2d 788, 793 (NJ. 1993). Like the federal courts, state
courts disagree on this issue. A Michigan appellate court found that because a state
statute did not authorize the parties to appeal substantive matters following an arbitration,
a clause in the parties' contract authorizing an appeal on the ground that the arbitrator
made an "[error] of substance" was not enforceable. Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 579. Similarly,
in South Washington Associates a Colorado appellate court held that parties cannot define
by contract the power of a court of law. 859 P.2d at 220. According to the court, the
parties' agreement to authorize appellate court review using the same standard as the
court would use to review a trial court decision was invalid because the authority to
determine jurisdiction of a state appellate court belongs to the legislature rather than the
parties. Interpreting the statute granting it jurisdiction, the court rejected the claim that
the "award" of a panel of arbitrators fell within the category of "final judgments" which
the legislature authorized the court to hear. Id. More generally, the court stated, while
parties have the freedom to formulate the arbitral process, the power to "define and
prescribe the powers of a court of law" belongs to the legislature alone. Id.
By contrast, a New York appellate court enforced the parties' agreement to allow
judicial review to determine if an arbitral award was arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly
erroneous as to evidence bad faith. See NAB Constr. Corp., 579 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
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expand judicial review of arbitral awards. The Gateway approach
represents an extreme freedom of contract approach-contracts
should be honored without regard to questions of limitations on
jurisdiction. The Chicago Typographical approach goes the opposite
direction, prohibiting parties from agreeing to any standard of review
not identified in the FAA.
Kozinski's position suggests a
compromise-allow parties to contract for standards of review as long
as the court is familiar with them. Since the cases could have been in
federal court in the absence of the parties' arbitration agreement,
reasons Kozinski, enforcement of familiar standards of review will be
efficient and will not violate any important federal jurisdictional
principles.
IV. Application of the Proposed Framework to Parties'
Requests for Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards
None of the current judicial analyses of parties' requests for
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards are satisfactory. All three
approaches are flawed for two reasons. First, the approaches do not
consider whether the Federal Arbitration Act limits federal court
review of arbitral awards to those bases identified in FAA § 10(a).
Second, the approaches are inadequate because they fail to evaluate
independently the impact granting particular requests might have on
courts' institutional integrity. While Kozinski's approach comes
closest to the mark, in that he would reject those requests which
would require the court to engage in unfamiliar work, even his
approach does not adequately acknowledge the need for a separate
inquiry by the courts themselves to determine whether the parties'
request would undermine the courts' institutional integrity.
Application of the two-step test, developed from careful analysis of
judicial treatment of other non-traditional requests for exercises of
judicial power, suggests that some limitations on the willingness of
courts to grant parties' requests for expanded judicial review of
arbitral awards is appropriate.
A. Statutory Authority

The central issue in each of the cases evaluating party requests for
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards, not explicitly addressed
in any of them, is whether the FAA's limitations on judicial review
are mandatory or default rules. 228 In evaluating any novel request for
228. Default rules are those statutory and common law principles that govern party
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judicial action, the court must first establish that the court has
statutory authority to grant the request. If FAA §10(a) establishes a
mandatory rule, the parties' agreement to expand judicial review

beyond section 10(a) must be rejected because the court does not
have the power to enforce it. If section 10(a) is a default rule, then
the court has the authority to enforce the agreement, if it does not
otherwise require the court to engage in arbitrary and capricious

decision-making. The principal objective of this section is to
determine whether the FAA limits the judicial review of arbitral
awards to the reasons section 10(a) identifies or whether the FAA
simply provides a default rule to govern situations where parties do

not request more judicial involvement than the existing statute
authorizes.

The presumption should be in favor of achieving the social policy
objectives of the FAA with default rules if possible since default rules
better preserve the concept of freedom of contract by allowing parties
to opt out of them in favor of a regime they prefer. 229 Moreover,
unlike a mandatory rule, a default term limits the potential loss that

may result to "the lesser of two amounts: (1) the cost to parties of
contracting back to their desired rule and (2) the cost to parties living
with an undesirable default." 230 If it is determined that the FAA's

judicial review provision is a mandatory rule, by contrast, the
potential loss that could result is always the latter, which imposes

significant costs on parties who would otherwise have negotiated
around the rule.
behavior unless parties by contract opt out of them. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules
from Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 706

(1999). Mandatory rules are legislatively created obligations that parties cannot contract
around. Id.

229. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on the Indefinite Term
Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, WIS. L. REV. 837, 869 (1995);
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989); Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts:
The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 733 (1933). The

presumption that default rules are preferable to mandatory rules may be incorrect if there
is reason to suspect the validity of parties' choices. In such a situation, a mandatory rule
would be preferable to avoid these mistakes. For example, I have argued elsewhere that
employees should not be bound to pre-dispute arbitration agreements that they sign as a
condition of employment because they have disparate negotiation incentives (when
compared to the employer) and because they systematically underestimate the significance
of the provision that they sign. See Cole, supra note 152. In the cases where parties agree
to expand judicial review of arbitral awards, there is little reason to suspect the validity of
the parties' choices because the parties are both repeat players with significant experience
in negotiating such agreements.
230. Verkerke, supra note 229, at 869.
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Both the Gateway and Kyocera courts must have concluded that
the FAA's rules are default rules rather than mandatory terms

because their decisions allow parties to contract around FAA § 10(a).
To determine whether section 10(a) is a mandatory rule or a default
allocation that parties can contract around is a question that should
be answered, if possible, primarily by examining the FAA's language

and the congressional intent underlying the drafting of that language.
The standard textualist approach to statutory interpretation

assumes that the goal of statutory analysis is to give effect to the
expressed intent of Congress. 31 To determine what Congress
intended, this analysis traditionally starts and ends with the "plain
language of the statute." 232

Difficulties arise when the statutory

language is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of the
interpretive question but the statutory language fails to address it. In
that situation, courts tend to examine not only the statutory language,
but its context and the statute's structure as well. 23 3

If that

examination fails to provide sufficient illumination, resort is often
made to legislative history. 234 While Congress has not endorsed this
method of analysis as a means for elucidating statutory meaning, the
idea that the analysis should focus on the statute's text, context and

structure is currently in vogue as it reduces the extent to which judges,
using their discretion, become the real "authors of the rule."23 5

Examining the plain language of the FAA does not explicitly
answer the question of whether the limited review outlined in section
231. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1993); Central Bank v.
First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994); Sanchez v. Pacific Powder Co., 147 F.3d
1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, this court looks first
to the words Congress used"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 407, 415-16 (1989) (writing that textualism, which looks to the
statutory language as the source of judicial power, is "enjoying a renaissance in a number
of recent cases"); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Continuation Coverage Under COBRA: A Study
in Statutory Interpretation,22 J. LEGIS. 195, 210 (1996) (citing a variety of commentators,
including Hart and Sacks, stating that the starting point for the court in matters of
statutory interpretation is to give effect to congressional intent). Textualism is not the
only approach to statutory interpretation. See Sunstein, supra, at 415-41. Because it
receives a certain general acceptance among academics and courts, it will be applied to the
FAA language.
232. Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997) (the "cardinal principle of statutory
construction" requires a court to give effect "to every clause and word of a statute");
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998); Lutheran Hosp. v. Businessmen's
Assurance Co. of Am., 51 F.3d 1308,1312 (7th Cir. 1995).
233. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990).
See also Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 1992).
234. See Cole, supra note 231, at 210; Garcia v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 70,75 (1985).
235. Herrmann,978 F.2d at 436.
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10(a) represents a mandatory limit or merely a default rule. At first
glance, section 10(a) would appear to give a federal court the power
to vacate an award only when the arbitrator's actions jeopardize the
procedural fairness of the arbitration.236 Yet the section does not
require the court to vacate the award even when these bases appear.
According to section 10(a), in any of the following "cases," i.e., where
procedural irregularity has occurred, a federal court "may make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party." The use
of the word "may" suggests that the court's action is not mandatory.
While section 10(a) is not particularly clear on this issue,
FAA § 9 contains language supporting the argument that the
statutory grounds articulated in section 10(a) are exclusive.
According to section 9: "[tlhe court must grant such an order
[confirming the award] unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed by sections 10 and 11 of this Title." At least
one federal appellate court interpreted this language to mean that
Congress did not want federal courts to conduct a de novo review of
arbitral awards on their merits; rather, it "commanded that when the
exceptions do not apply, a federal court has no choice but to
confirm."237

The identification of only four bases for vacatur in the FAA, all
of which allow vacation only where procedural irregularities appear,
also suggests that the drafters of the FAA were concerned exclusively
with ensuring the procedural regularity of the arbitral decisionmaking process, rather than guaranteeing that the arbitral decision is
correct on the merits. While the statutory criteria outlined in Section
10(a) appear to focus primarily on preventing inappropriate
arbitrator conduct rather than on ensuring that the underlying
decision is correct, courts and commentators have offered broader
readings of Section 10(a).

236. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1992). Thomas Carbonneau
contends that FAA § 10 does not contemplate review of arbitral awards on the merits.
"[I]n fact," he states, "such a practice contradicts the gravamen of the legislation and the
judicial policy that sprang from it." THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION 260 (1997).
237. UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir.
1998) The UHC court concluded that, in light of the FAA's language, it is not clear that
the Kyocera decision was correct. The court stated: "We do not believe it is a foregone
conclusion that parties may effectively agree to compel a federal court to cast aside
sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA." Id. The UHC court did not have to rule on the issue,
however, because the parties had not clearly stated that they wanted to depart from the
statutory review standard. Id.
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For example, at least one commentator has argued that section
10(a)(4) contemplates significant judicial oversight of the arbitration
award.23 8 According to Professor Stephen Ware, section 10(a)(4),
which permits reversal of arbitral awards because the arbitrator
exceeded his authority, necessarily includes the ability to reverse such
awards where the arbitrator did not apply the correct law.239 In other
words, section 10(a)(4) authorizes reversal of an arbitral award when
an error of law is made. Courts have not extended section 10(a)(4)
that far; at the present time, it has only been applied to cases where
the arbitrator has decided an issue not properly before her or where
she directed a remedy that was not within her power to order. Thus,
to this point, section 10(a)(4) has only peripherally applied to the
240
merits of the underlying case.
Professors Edward Brunet and Charles Craver have argued that
the language in FAA § 10(a)(3) contemplates a merit-based review of
arbitral awards. 241 According to Brunet and Craver, section 10(a)(3)
allows reversal of an arbitrator's award when the arbitrator's
misbehavior prejudices the "rights" of any party. The use of the term
rights "must mean that the drafters intended that courts should have
242
some ability to set aside awards because of denials of 'rights.' '
Rights in this context would include the ability to have the award
reversed where a misinterpretation of the law by the arbitrator
resulted in a denial of rights. Thus, the Brunet-Craver reading of
section 10(a)(3) would allow the court to reverse an arbitral award for
an error of law that resulted in a denial of rights. While courts have
never read section 10(a)(3) this broadly, it certainly raises the
question whether the provision should be more broadly construed.
Although the language of section 10(a), when read in the context
provided by section 9 would seem to establish that the FAA provided
the exhaustive list of reasons for reversal of an arbitral award, it is
difficult to conclude confidently that this is the case. The analysis of
the section suggests three possible outcomes: (1) that Congress
intended to allow federal courts great freedom in deciding whether
and when to vacate an arbitral award; (2) that Congress wanted to
limit the bases for vacation to those listed in section 10(a); or (3)
238. See Ware, supra note 228, at 737.
239. See id.
240. See id. While this is a much broader reading of the section than the courts have
suggested is appropriate, it raises the question whether section 10(a)(4) is subject to more
than one construction.
241. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 156, at 411-12.
242. Id.
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Congress did not contemplate parties requesting greater judicial
review than section 10(a) provides. For the reasons following, the
most likely explanation is the third one.
Section 10(a) is not a significant departure from common law or
state statutory arbitration as it existed prior to the FAA's passage. 243
According to Professor MacNeil, the adoption of section 10 was, for
practical reasons, an unnecessary step as the existing common law
already limited the bases upon which a court could vacate an arbitral
award. 244 In fact, the 1921 draft of the FAA did not include any
provisions governing judicial review of arbitral awards. 245 This is not
surprising since the 1921 draft mirrored the 1920 New York
arbitration law, which also failed to include any provisions dealing
with the process for reviewing awards. 246
Thus, it would seem likely that the drafters of the FAA were
simply attempting to codify what they perceived to be the existing
consensus regarding judicial review of arbitral awards-that review
should be limited to reversal on the grounds of procedural
irregularity. It is quite probable that the drafters simply did not
contemplate that parties would ever be interested in expanding
judicial review of arbitration awards. Nothing in the legislative
history jeopardizes this assumption. In fact, the legislative history
focuses almost entirely on the critical issue that the FAA was passed
to address:
the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. 247 The Supreme Court's examination of the FAA's
legislative history supports the notion that Congress passed the FAA
primarily in order to ensure that parties' pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate would be enforced. 248 The absence of discussion of judicial
review in the legislative history suggests that the drafters intended to
codify the common law, which limited review to examination of the
arbitral award for procedural irregularities.
Because the language of the FAA and its legislative history is
somewhat inconclusive on the issue of expanding statutory grounds
243. See MACNEIL, supra note 176, at 104. Although American courts and legislatures'
treatment of arbitral awards was not consistent, for the most part, courts and legislatures
provided only limited judicial review of arbitral awards even where the arbitrator had
ruled on issues of law.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 86.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (holding an
agreement to arbitrate enforceable even when pleaded together with nonarbitrable claims
in a complaint).

1256

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51

for vacatur beyond the reasons articulated in section 10(a),
examination of the judicial treatment of the four bases for vacatur
listed in section 10(a) may help to eliminate the ambiguity.
Some courts of appeal have held that the section 10(a)
establishes the exclusive grounds for vacating commercial arbitration
awards. 249 Yet most other court of appeals have vacated arbitral
awards on grounds not articulated in section 10(a). 50 According to
the latter courts, the acceptable nonstatutory grounds for vacatur
include that the award was: in manifest disregard of the law,
completely irrational, in direct conflict with public policy, arbitrary
and capricious or failed to draw its essence from the parties'
underlying contract 2 51
Courts have accepted the "manifest disregard of the law"
standard for vacatur more frequently than the other nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards.252 This basis for appealing an

249. See R.M. Perez & Assocs., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534,539-40 (5th Cir. 1992); O.R.
Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 1988). For
additional cases, see Brad A. Galbraith, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in
Federal Court: Contemplatingthe Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law
Standard,27 IND. L. REV. 241,248 (1993).
250. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 239 (1st Cir. 1995); Willemijn
Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997).
But see, Mcllroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting any
non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards).
251. Five federal courts of appeals-the Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits-have recognized one or more of these nonstatutory grounds for vacatur. See
Hayford, supra note 190, at 463. Five other federal courts of appeals-the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits-however, have stated their positions much less
clearly. At times, cases from the circuits indicate a desire to limit review to the statutory
grounds, asserting that section 10(a) establishes the "exclusive grounds" for vacating
arbitration awards; at other times, as Professor Hayford notes, each of these courts has
issued decisions granting vacatur on one of the non-statutory vacatur grounds. Id. at 46364.
252. Id. at 465. Only the Fourth Circuit has consistently rejected parties' attempts to
avoid arbitral awards on nonstatutory grounds. Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143
(4th Cir. 1994). When Congress enacted the FAA, the court stated, it intended to limit the
grounds for vacatur to the four listed in section 10(a) of the FAA. Id. According to the
Remmey court, "[t]he statutory grounds for vacatur permit challenges on sufficiently
improper conduct in the course of the proceedings; they do not permit rejection of an
arbitral award based on disagreement with the particular result the arbitrators reached."
Id. Both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have declined to adopt the "manifest
disregard" standard, although they have not expressly rejected it. Ainsworth v. Skurnick,
960 F.2d 939, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus.,
Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th Cir. 1986). Three circuits have criticized the standard.
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994); Raiford v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412-13 (11th Cir. 1990); I/S Stavborg
v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1974).
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arbitral award emerged from the dictum of a 1953 Supreme Court
decision, Wilko v. Swan. 53 In Wilko, the Court said that
[w]hile it may be true.., that a failure of the arbitrators to decide
in accordance with the provisions of the [applicable law] would
"constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section
10[(a)] of the Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to
be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submission [to
arbitration] ...the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject,
in the federal courts,
to judicial review for error in interpretation. 254
Many appellate courts have construed Wilko as adding a nonstatutory
ground to the already existing grounds for vacatur listed in section
10(a). This position is controversial for several reasons. First, it is not
clear that the Wilko Court intended to add a "nonstatutory" ground
to the existing grounds for vacatur. The Court stated that the
arbitrator's manifest disregard of existing law constitutes "grounds for
vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the FederalArbitration
Act."' 55 It would seem that the Court was merely interpreting the
statutory grounds listed in section 10(a) to include cases where an
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law-in other words, she knew
what the law was and ignored it. Certainly, section 10(a)(4), allowing
vacatur where the arbitrator exceeds his powers could fit within its
purview situations where the arbitrator ignores existing law.25 6 Other
federal courts have adopted this interpretation of Wilko, holding that
the "manifest disregard" standard is derived from, rather than
2 7
independent of, section 10(a). 5
Moreover, it is questionable whether the dictum establishing the
"manifest disregard" standard is still good law. At the time Wilko v.
Swan was decided, the Court was extremely suspicious of arbitration
as a means to resolve statutory claims. That suspicion has long since
been abandoned and Wilko overruled on the ground that statutory
253. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
254. Id. at 436-37 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)) (citations
omitted).
255. Id. (quoting Wilko, 201 F.2d at 445) (emphasis added).
256. Although the Court has mentioned the manifest disregard standard in three other
opinions, it has never clarified the relationship between the "manifest disregard" standard
and Section 10. Thus, it is open to interpretation as to the meaning underlying the Court's
dictum in Wilko. Other commentators raise the issue whether the Wilko dictum may have
been intended merely to "illustrate an instance which would fall within the scope of the
Federal Arbitration Act's provisions for vacating an arbitration award," rather than
creating an independent statutory ground for vacatur. Galbraith, supra note 249, at 257.
257. See Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache See., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,933 (2d Cir. 1986).
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claims are appropriate subjects of arbitration. In light of the changed
judicial attitude toward arbitration, one wonders whether the
Supreme Court's 1953 position that awards could be overturned for
8
manifest disregard of the law would still be the Court's view today2
Similar difficulties are apparent when the other nonstatutory
grounds are examined. The remaining nonstatutory grounds are
inconsistent with the plain language of section 10(a) of the FAA
because they contemplate a substantive review of the underlying
arbitral award. Moreover, the Supreme Court has not recognized any
of these nonstatutory grounds as additional bases for vacating arbitral
awards. Finally, unlike the "manifest disregard" standard, none of
the remaining nonstatutory grounds have reached any level of
acceptance among the federal appellate courts. In light of this lack of
consensus and inconsistency with FAA intent, the remaining
nonstatutory grounds do little to undermine the argument that the
FAA's standards for judicial review are mandatory rules.
An examination of the FAA's statutory language, its legislative
history and subsequent judicial interpretation of its language does not
clearly indicate that the FAA's review provisions are either
mandatory or default rules. As courts and commentators have
repeatedly suggested, section 10(a)'s language is susceptible of more
than one interpretation. An interpretation that would permit courts
to grant parties' requests for greater review of arbitral awards would
be consistent with a permissible interpretation of the language of
section 10(a) and the purpose underlying the FAA. Although the
opposite conclusion is also an acceptable interpretation, given the
importance of freedom of contract and the presumption in favor of
finding that the FAA creates default rules rather than mandatory
ones, a conclusion that the FAA authorizes courts to grant party
requests would seem the better result.
B. When do Parties' Requests for Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards Threaten Institutional Integrity?

Assuming courts have the authority to enforce agreements to
expand judicial review of arbitral awards, the next question is whether
such agreements threaten the institutional integrity of the court.
258. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994)
("[The Wilko] formula reflects precisely that mistrust of arbitration for which the Court in
its two Shearson/American opinions criticized Wilko. We can understand neither the need
for the formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration [awards] (we
suspect none-that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the
back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modem law of arbitration.").
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Typically, parties have asked courts to review arbitral awards utilizing
standards such as "errors of law." Using notions of party autonomy,
courts have quickly approved the use of this standard and others,
applying to them to review arbitral awards. In so doing, the courts
evaluating these requests have virtually ignored the threat the use of
such standards pose to institutional integrity. 259
Systematic
application of an institutional integrity standard to parties' requests
would force courts to evaluate carefully whether adoption of the
parties' proposed standard for reviewing the arbitral award
undermined the court's integrity. Using an integrity review, a court
could easily reject a proposed standard that would require the court
to review the underlying arbitral award by flipping a coin or studying
the entrails of a dead fowl. Moreover, application of such a standard
would ensure that courts evaluate properly requests that might
appear, at first glance, not to threaten the court's integrity.
In the arbitral context, for instance, courts have routinely upheld
parties' request for application of the "errors of law" standard. While
this standard might not appear to threaten the court's integrity
because courts review all kinds of decisions for legal errors, it is
nevertheless problematic because it asks the court to review the
underlying award even in the absence of a record or written opinion
from the proceedings before the arbitrator.26° A court's rubber-stamp
of the underlying decision in the absence of a record when the parties'
chosen standard anticipates a more meaningful review may
undermine institutional integrity because it makes the court appear to
be an unprincipled decision-maker.
When such a case presents itself, how might a court go about
engaging in an integrity review? Analogies to consent decrees,
259. While the majority opinions in these cases reflect little concern for the court's
integrity, Judge Kozinski's concurrence in Kyocera suggests that, for him, concerns about
the court's integrity are relevant to the discussion. Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,
130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Kozinski's comment that his
decision might be different if the parties had asked the court to "review the award by
flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl," shows a recognition that freedom
of contract must yield in those cases where the integrity of the courts as an institution is
threatened. See id.
260. In modern arbitration, it is unusual for parties to maintain a record of their arbitral
hearing or for an arbitrator to write an opinion. Thus, when the parties request judicial
review of the arbitral award, there is little for a court to review. When a court reviewed
arbitral awards for procedural irregularities alone, the lack of a record or opinion was not
viewed as problematic. As Stephen Hayford notes, commercial arbitrators rarely set forth
the reasons underlying their decisions in a written opinion. See Hayford, supra note 190,
at 444-45. Nevertheless, courts have routinely applied the FAA's four bases for vacatur.

See id. at 452-53.
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summary jury trials, requests for magistrates and requests for vacatur
are not especially helpful in this context because they involve an
integrity review of the parties' request to facilitate settlement using
non-traditional means, not an application of a standard of review to a
decision. Perhaps an analogy to administrative law would be more
helpful because courts routinely review administrative agencies'
informal adjudications. 261
Like arbitrations, informal agency
adjudications resolve disputes between two parties. When a court
reviews an informal agency decision, it considers whether the
agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious. A decision is rejected
as arbitrary and capricious if the agency offered an explanation for its
decision that contradicts the evidence that was before the agency at
the time of the decision, or failed to supply a reasoned analysis
supporting its decision.262 In other words, application of an arbitrary
and capricious standard performs the function of assuring sufficient
factual support for a decision. 263 By applying the arbitrary and
capricious rule, courts attempt to strike a balance between excessive
judicial intervention in agency decision-making, on the one hand, and
abdication of traditional control over judicial power on the other 64
As in administrative law, application of an arbitrary and
capricious standard to evaluate party requests for expanded judicial
review of arbitral awards requires a court to ensure that it is capable
of reviewing the underlying decision using the standard the parties
propose. If a court is unable to apply the parties' standard because
there is no record to which it may apply the standard, the court would
reject the standard as requiring the court to engage in arbitrary and
capricious decision-making and dismiss the parties' case. 65
261. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (stating
that agency decisions are reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1973) (holding that in
the absence of reasoned analysis, change in agency policy is rejected as arbitrary and
capricious).
262. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc., 463 U.S. at 29. In the agency context, the court
will also consider whether the agency has relied on factors which Congress did not intend
it to consider or failed to consider factors that it should have considered. See id.
263. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
264. See Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the
application of the arbitrary and capricious rule to ERISA disputes strikes the appropriate
balance between the need for judicial control of fiduciaries' actions with the need to avoid
excessive judicial intervention in the discharge of trustees' discretionary duties).
265. In reviewing arbitral awards based on a standard the parties' propose, courts
would utilize the arbitrary and capricious standard somewhat differently than would
courts reviewing agency decisions. Rather than ensuring that the agency has not acted
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Of course, adoption of "arbitrary and capricious" as the standard
for reviewing parties' requests is not a panacea.
Unlike
administrative law, where the administrative agency is a party to the
proceeding in front of the district court and is therefore subject to the
court's orders, in arbitration, the court cannot order the arbitrator to
do anything because the arbitrator is not a party to the enforcement
action, only the parties to the arbitration are. Because the court has
no power to order the arbitrator to do anything, the court has no
power to remand the case to the arbitrator for development of a
record or drafting of an opinion.
The answer, then, is for the court to reject the parties' request for
expanded judicial review on the basis that it requires arbitrary and
capricious action by the court, which would undermine the court's
institutional integrity. Then the parties, if they so choose, can
commission the arbitrator to write an opinion or, in their next
agreement, agree to maintain a record of the arbitral proceedings. 266
Failure to include such a provision would result in application of the
default rules outlined in section 10(a) of the FAA.
C. Allowing Expanded Review of Arbitral Awards May Not Conserve
Judicial Resources
While the proposed test does not require consideration of resources
issues, an analysis of that question in the arbitral context supports the
notion that such an inquiry would be futile. As with summary jury
trials and consent decrees, the perception is that expanded judicial
review of arbitral awards would conserve judicial resources by
encouraging more parties to arbitrate cases that would otherwise have
been brought in federal court. It may be true that allowing parties to
expand judicial review will create an incentive for parties, previously
reluctant to agree to arbitrate, to contract for arbitration. If more
parties agree to arbitrate with an expanded review standard, the
amount of work courts must do for each arbitrated case may also

arbitrarily and capriciously, in the case of arbitral award review, the court is ensuring that
application of the parties' standard does not require the court to act arbitrarily and
capriciously. Despite this difference, the administrative law analogy seems helpful in that,
in both administrative law and elsewhere, the court's concern is to ensure that arbitrary
and capricious decision-making is not tolerated.
266. Unlike early state habeas corpus cases where a state trial court's failure to
maintain a record did not preclude substantive review, in the arbitral context, there is
typically little in the manner of pleadings or discovery to review. Thus, a record or
opinion requirement is essential because, without such a requirement, the court would
have nothing to which they could apply the parties' proposed standard of review.
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increase because appealed cases will be subject to more extensive
review. Thus, judicial resources will be conserved only if the savings
incurred by decreasing the number of cases in court is not offset by
the rise in costs that will result from the increased number of arbitral
award review cases a court must hear. One might speculate that
parties who insert an expanded judicial review provision into their
arbitral agreement are more likely to make use of that provision. If
so, the increased costs associated with hearing arbitral award appeals
may exceed the savings gained by decreasing the number of court
cases through diversion by agreement to arbitration. Of course, the
opposite might also be true. In the absence of empirical study, a court
would have great difficulty concluding that approving a request for
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards would be more cost
efficient than rejecting it.
V. Conclusion
Recent court decisions, particularly in the arbitral context, reflect
an eagerness to embrace the notion of party autonomy in dispute
resolution. In welcoming party requests for non-traditional use of
judicial resources, however, the courts have improperly ignored
congressionally and constitutionally imposed limitations on judicial
power. Moreover, courts have failed to develop any consistent
procedure for evaluating party requests. The reasons for this failure
are not difficult to divine. Granting party requests for non-traditional
judicial involvement would seem to be both convenient and efficient.
To examine in every case whether the court has authority to grant the
parties' request as well as whether the request is one that ought to be
granted would be self-defeating. Such a process does not fulfill the
promise of ADR to provide quicker and cheaper justice.
Yet efficiency is not everything.
At least some courts
acknowledge that obtaining efficient results at the expense of fairness
is not a laudable achievement. Moreover, these courts recognize that,
in our constitutional system, efficiency cannot be achieved at the
expense of rights. Thus, in evaluating a variety of party requests,
these courts have begun to ask very similar questions about statutory
authority and institutional integrity issues. This Article proposes that
courts adopt a unified approach to these issues in every case where
parties request non-traditional use of judicial resources. Under this
scenario, courts would, if possible, first identify a statute or rule that
permits it to grant parties' requests. Once authority is established, the
court would engage in a process designed to ensure that the integrity
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of the court as an institution remains in tact. A review of the parties'
request, designed to root out those requests that might damage
society's perception of the courts as principled decision-makers,
should adequately protect the status of the court as an institution.
While adoption of this test is unlikely to change the outcome of
many court decisions, it would provide the kind of uniformity that
would encourage party autonomy, which is useful in developing new
and better ways of resolving disputes, while, at the same time,
protecting the court as an institution. Moreover, the proposed test
would allow courts the necessary means for evaluating parties'
requests that a court review an arbitral decision using a standard the
parties propose. While such requests have been rubber-stamped by
the courts in past cases, the proposed test would ensure the protection
of the court's institutional integrity through application of an
arbitrary and capricious review.
Already utilized routinely in
administrative law to review agency decisions to ensure adequate
factual support, an arbitrary and capricious review would allow a
court to reject those party request that might not initially appear to
threaten the court's integrity but actually do-such as requests for
intensive review of an underlying decision where no record of the
decision was kept.
This two-step review process acknowledges that courts are not
puppets that litigants may manipulate as they wish. Courts do, and
should continue to do, what is possible, given their limited authority,
to grant party requests. After all, freedom of contract is an essential
precept in our judicial system. Yet courts must refrain from granting
requests that they do not have authority to grant. Moreover, courts
must preserve the integrity of the court as an institution by rejecting
those requests that would diminish the court's stature in the public's
eyes.
For arbitration, this means that parties' requests for expanded
review of arbitral awards should be approved so long as they do not
require arbitrary and capricious decision-making by the court. While
application of this test allows the "errors of law" standard to pass
muster,267 any request that the court review the arbitral award by a
flip of a coin or by studying the entrails of a dead fowl, as Judge
268
Kozinski so eloquently suggested, must be rejected.
267. The "errors of law" standard is only acceptable if the parties have also agreed that
the arbitrator would write an opinion explaining his factual findings and legal conclusions.
268. See Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).

